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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this mini-thesis is to examine the inconsistency in the implementation of the 
responsibility to protect (RTP) principle during armed conflicts with specific focus on the 
case of Libya and Darfur. Furthermore the mini-thesis scrutinizes the criteria which are 
utilized universally and questions whether the principle is determined by factors such as 
economics, politics and location depending on each crisis.  The significance of this mini-
thesis derives from the need to make a contribution to the new interventionism debate and 
contribute to the growing literature on the doctrine of the RTP especially when it comes to 
the inconsistencies during its application which seems to be on the rise especially in the 
African continent.The mini-thesis was guided by the following assumption that there are 
inconsistencies when it comes to the application of the RTP under humanitarian law. 
 
The mini-thesis also embarks on an enquiry into the legal aspects of the RTP doctrine and the 
legal status of humanitarian intervention. It is worth noting that the RTP doctrine does not 
concentrate on every human rights violation or abuse of power, even when these are very 
serious as in the case of Sudan. It certainly does not empower or establish an obligation on 
the international community to respond by over-riding the offending state’s sovereignty. The 
initial intention of the RTP was aimed at preventing mass attacks or large scale violations 
involving genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It is greatly 
disappointing to note that the international community at large tends to overlook the more 
severe crises which have more casualties and turn their eyes on less serious humanitarian 
crises. This raises concern about the extent of the inconsistency in the application of the RTP. 
The question that begs an answer therefore is why intervene in Libya and not Darfur?   
 
In conclusion to this mini-thesis I came to the realization that inconsistencies within the 
application of the RTP exist because humanitarian intervention under the RTP has a massive 
political element which affects implementation. The RTP is often used as a justification for 
states to act in conflicts when there is no domestic support for more direct political 
intervention. Thus, I believe that intervention can never be completely humanitarian driven 
until the five RTP precautionary principles are used as a guideline or criteria for 
interventions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. Introduction  
The last decades we have witnessed a development in the international arena towards new 
norms and standards, designed to protect civilians during humanitarian crises.1 This notion 
became known as the responsibility to protect (RTP) and has become established since the 
turn of the millennium. At the same time we can observe a change in the behaviour during 
war by the western powers, where territorial conquest is no longer the main objective. Instead 
wars are fought for values, and are more humane in their nature.2 This mini-thesis seeks to 
outline and probe the inconsistencies that exist in the implementation of the RTP principle. It 
is further clarified with reference to two instances where the RTP norm was applied, and 
where it failed to deliver on its mandate, namely the intervention during the Libyan crisis and 
the Sudanese crisis that still continues to date with no stability in sight.  
 
The crisis in Darfur begs the question whether the RTP principle should be used, or admit its 
defeat. There have been reports of ‘large-scale loss of life due to deliberate state action, 
neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation’3 and voices arguing for humanitarian 
interventions are in abundance. In this mini-thesis reference was also made to the ‘Arab 
Spring’, especially in Libya, which has been another instance where NATO used force to 
prevent human suffering using the RTP principle.4 Other countries affected by the 
revolutionary fervour may be included; there was no reference to Syria, despite the ongoing 
internal armed conflict, and the widespread condemnation from the international community. 
This is a result of the fact that the events in Syria are still unfolding, which would force the 
study to be more speculative than hoped in respect of the inconsistencies of the application of 
the RTP. 
 
The end of the Second World War in 1945 saw the birth of the United Nations (UN). The UN 
succeeded the League of Nations created in 1919 after the First World War.5 The UN was 
 
1
 Ramesh T The United Nations, Peace and Security (2006)65.  
2
 Pattison J Whose responsibility to protect? The Duties of Humanitarian Intervention Journal of Military Ethics 
(2008) 7 (hereafter Whose responsibility to protect). 
3
 Ramesh T The United Nations, Peace and Security, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2006) 258-261. 
4
 Pollack M The Real Military Options in Libya (2011), available at 
www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0309_libya_pollack.aspx  (accessed 1 January 2012). 
5
 Chamberlin W, Hovet T & Hovet E  A Chronology and Fact Book of The United Nations 1941-1976 (1976)12.  
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founded to save future generations from the horrors of war crimes and human rights 
violations that occur during armed conflicts.6 The maintenance of peace and security is the 
highest priority of the UN and peacekeeping missions are tasked to meet this challenge. 
Despite the creation of the UN to maintain world peace and stability and to prevent the world 
from moving towards another global conflagration, a look at the international scene for the 
past two decades has strongly revealed that armed conflicts (both international and internal) 
have continued to spring up here and there in the world and has blighted the lives of millions 
of civilians. 7 
 
The RTP is a principle that aims to protect the world’s most vulnerable populations from the 
most heinous international crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. In recent decades, armed conflict has blighted the lives of millions of civilians.8 
The serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law are common in 
many armed conflicts and in certain circumstances; some of these violations may even 
constitute genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. As a result of these ongoing 
circumstances the use of military intervention through the UN birthed the RTP principle.  
 
Like most norms and principles, the RTP is bound to see its capacity to deliver on its 
intended goals tested by real experience. Since the inception of the RTP by member states at 
the UN General Assembly in 2005,9 a number of cases have helped define the boundaries of 
its application. Well before Libya, the RTP had already made a discrete difference in a 
number of cases; from the most cited example of the political and diplomatic response to the 
outbreak of ethnic violence in Kenya in early 2008, the irregular response to signs of ethnic 
cleansing in Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 2010 and the more forceful regional and 
international efforts in Guinea at the end of that year.10 The challenge faced in Libya was of a 
high magnitude. The crisis rapidly escalated to a point where the UN Security Council had to 
 
6
 UN Charter, Article 1(1),   available   at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml (accessed  4 
October 2013). 
7
 International Armed Conflicts are conflicts between two or more states and Non-International Armed Conflicts 
are defined as conflicts between Governmental Authorities of a State and organized armed groups in the 
framework of that State. 
8
 Findlay T The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations SIPRI, Stockholm (2002) 208.   
9
 UNGA Resolution 1674, available at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8710.doc.htm (accessed 19 
December 2011). 
10
 Norton-Taylor R Nato Ends Military Operations in Libya The Guardian (2011) available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/31/nato-ends-libya-rasmussen  (accessed 28 December 2011). 
 
 
 
 


consider the use of military force to halt mass atrocity crimes that were already occurring as 
the Gaddafi regime used tanks, aircraft and troops to suppress mass protests.11 
 
The aim of the RTP doctrine when it was endorsed and adopted at the UN General Assembly 
2005 world summit was to halt genocides like those in Rwanda and Bosnia.12 This is the 
main reason advanced by those who favour the dotrine of  the RTP in justifying the air strikes 
in Libya.13 It is said that the international military intervention (SMH) in Libya was to protect 
the people of the country and not to end Gaddafi's life.  
The military intervention in Libya was viewed as a victory for the RTP doctrine by many 
commentators, even though some critics of the doctrine said it was used for political 
objectives and not purely humanitarian purposes.14 The RTP doctrine clearly states that if a 
state fails to protect its citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity,15 it becomes the international community's responsibility to do so and the  
use of military force by the international community can be utilzed if peaceful measures 
prove inadequate.16 
It is this provision that the doctrine's supporters point to for justifying the air strikes in Libya 
by some Western countries, including the USA.17 Shortly after the intervention in Libya  the 
word from the UN was that the international military intervention in Libya was not about 
 
11
 Dunne T & Gifkins J Libya and R2P: norm consolidation or a perfect storm?  Open Democracy (2011), 
available at www.opendemocracy.net/tim-dunne-jess-gifkins/libya-and-r2p-norm-consolidation-or-perfect-storm 
(accessed 14 April 2012). 
12
 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit outcome document, A/60/L.1, 15 September 2005, 
Article 138 (hereafter cited as UNGA, 2005 World Summit outcome). The text of this document is available at 
www.daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/ N0548760.pdf?Open Element (accessed 12 
September 2012). 
13
 Bellamy A responsibility to protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (2009) 71. 
14
 ‘Statement to the Security Council by Navi Pillay, High Commissioner for Human Rights (Libya)’, 
January 25, 2012, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Display 
News.aspx?NewsID=11779&LangID=E  (accessed  13 April 2012). 
15
 Traynor I & Watt N Libya No-Fly zone leadership squabbles within NATO The Guardian (2001), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/23/libya-no-fly-zone-leadership-squabbles (accessed 25 
December 2011). 
16
 Evans G The rresponsibility to pprotect : Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, (2004) 84.  
17
 Glen P Paradigm Shifts in International Justice and the duty to Protect; in search of an action principle 
University of Botswana Law Journal (2010) 24, available at 
http://www.pulp.up.ac.za/pdf/2011_02/2011_02_f_chapter2.pdf  (accessed  4 October 2013). 
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bombing for democracy or Gaddafi's head.18 The protection of the people of Libya was 
advanced as a legal, moral, political, and military justification for the intervention in Libya.19 
In addition those who favour the RTP doctrine also point to regional backing for the no-fly 
zone from organizations such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, stressing its international legitimacy.20 The 
international intervention in Kosovo is often mentioned as the standard example of 
humanitarian intervention. In 1999 several Western nations, without a Security Council 
resolution, led NATO to war with the then President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, in 
order to end the campaign of repression against ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of 
Kosovo.21 The intervention into Kosovo was conducted by air which saved financial costs as 
well as the lives of ground soldiers. In addition, the intervention was conducted without the 
full support of the Security Council. Both Russia and China opposed the intervention into 
Kosovo. This meant that the USA could not win a resolution with the backing of the UN. The 
Security Council did pass resolutions stating that what was occurring in Kosovo was a threat 
to peace.22 However, it did not authorize military force.23 
 
The Darfur conflict is an ongoing violent conflict set in western Sudan which has left ensuing 
debates at the Security Council over determining whether or not ‘genocide’ was unfolding in 
Darfur. It is important to note that no decisive action has been taken to protect thousands of 
Sudanese who are being massacred by their Government. It is also noteworthy that some 
situations are viewed as more crucial than others in terms of intervention. The Janjaweed 
along with other militia groups including the Sudanese Liberation Army are responsible for 
 
18
 Norton-Taylor R NATO will not put troops on ground in Libya’ The Guardian (2001), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/24/nato-will-not-put-troops-ground-libya (accessed 12 September 
2012). 
19
 See ‘Holding Libya Together: Security Challenges After Qadhafi’,  Middle East/ North Africa Report 
No. 115, International Crisis Group, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-
africa/north-africa/libya/115-holding-libya-together-security-challenges-after-qadhafi.aspx (accessed 14 
December 2011). 
20
 UN Security Council Report of the assessment mission on the impact of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel region 
7 to 23 December 2011, S/2012/42, (18 January 2012) available at www.securitycouncilreport.org/.pdf 
(accessed 13 April 2012). 
21
 Richard F ‘Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo’ 2006. 
22
 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and the Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 10 of the Security Council Resolution 1244 of 12 June 1999. 
23
 De Waal A No Such Thing as Humanitarian Intervention: Why We Need to Rethink How to Realize the  
‘responsibility to protect ' in Wartime Harvard International Review (27 March 2007), available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26062.html (accessed 17 August 2013). 
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attacks against civilians. According to UN estimates, the Janjaweed24 have killed over 
200,000 people. According to Minority Rights Group International (MRG) Executive 
Director Mark Lattimer:  
‘This level of crisis, the killings, rape and displacement could have been foreseen and avoided 
... Darfur would just not be in this situation had the UN systems took the necessary action 
together after Rwanda: their action was too little too late thus it brings us to the question of 
whether the application of the RTP is applied inconsistently’ 25  
 
1.2 The Purpose of the Study 
 This mini-thesis seeks to outline the inconsistency in the implementation of the RTP during 
humanitarian crises with specific focus on the case of Libya and Darfur. In addition the 
researcher also investigated whether there was a certain benchmark which was applied 
universally or whether the application of the principle is determined by factors such as 
economics, politics and location depending on each crisis. The issue of the inconsistency of 
the application of the RTP is an international socio-political problem which leads to many 
questions regarding the effectiveness and objectives of the RTP by those who apply it such as 
NATO. In this regard the purpose is directed by the research question as well as the 
objectives of the study influenced by this broad purpose. It is vital that this study elucidates 
and discerns patterns and tendencies of military intervention under the RTP doctrine from the 
1990s and recent ones. 
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
 Seems like there are irregularities when it comes to the application of the RTP principle by 
western powers and the UN. It is important to highlight that the RTP doctrine does not 
address every human rights violation or abuse of power, even when these are very 
serious, and it certainly does not empower or establish an obligation on the international 
community to respond by over-riding the offending state’s sovereignty.26 The RTP calls forth 
action to prevent mass attacks or large scale violations involving genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. However, the international community tends to 
overlook the more severe crises which have more casualties and turn their eyes on less 
 
24
 The Janjaweed is a militia group that has reportedly received extensive Government support. 
25
 Srinivasan S Minority Rights, Early Warning And Conflict Prevention: Lessons from Darfur Minority Rights 
Group International, (2006) 32. 
26
 Robinson P The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention (2002) 177. 
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serious humanitarian crises. This makes one think, to what extent the inconsistency of the 
RTP goes?27 The questions that beg answers are: why intervene in Libya and not Darfur?28 
Are decisions on the RTP made according to clear criteria and principles; or whether the 
doctrine is invoked only to advance big power interests in those countries were they decide to 
intervene? The RTP and humanitarian intervention as a whole have become part of the 
international political landscape. The act of military intervention is carried out by a range of 
different actors with different interests and motives; they are recurrent features in global 
politics. Their impact on world politics is tremendous. They reshape borders, topple 
Governments, they cause heavy inter-state flows of people and refugees, and they do indeed 
fulfil their designed purpose of rescuing millions of people from oppressive Governments 
and, sometimes, bring the leaders of these Governments to justice. 
 
1.4. Objectives of Mini-thesis 
Firstly the study seeks to examine the extent of the inconsistency in the application of the 
RTP and whether the doctrine is indeed effective. Secondly it seeks to outline what 
constitutes the RTP. Thirdly the study embarks on an enquiry into the legal aspects of 
military intervention and the legal status of humanitarian intervention. 
 
1.5. Research Questions 
This mini-thesis was guided by the research topic and the following research questions:  
• Does a right to intervene on humanitarian grounds exist legally?  
• Does the RTP serve its purpose under humanitarian law?  
• What are the criteria for humanitarian intervention under the RTP? 
• How has the RTP doctrine been implemented over the past two decades? 
 
1.6. Research Hypothesis 
The mini-thesis was guided by the following assumption: There are inconsistencies when it 
comes to the application of the RTP under humanitarian law. This was due to the fact that 
neither the UN nor any state has the necessary willpower to bring peace in the non-
international armed conflicts or simmering conflicts in Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan and 
 
27
 Evans G ‘From Humanitarian Intervention to R2P’, keynote address to symposium on humanitarian 
intervention  University of Wisconsin, Madison (March 2006). 
28
 Mkwate M & Ogbuna O African Union wants Inclusive Government in Libya The Herald. (23 September 
2011) available at http://www.herald.co.zw (accessed 10 September  2012). 
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Chad, yet some other humanitarian crisis have received quick attention and humanitarian 
intervention from the international community such as Libya. 
 
1.7. Rationale of Study 
The significance of this mini-thesis derives from the need to make a contribution to the new 
interventionism debate and contribute to the growing literature on the doctrine of the RTP 
especially when it comes to the inconsistencies during its application. 
  
1.8. Literature Review 
To gather in-depth knowledge of research conducted on the RTP doctrine and the 
inconsistencies on the application of this doctrine especially in the case of Libya and Darfur, 
the mini-thesis analysed scholarly works by different authors who wrote on this field. For the 
most part, these publications deal with military intervention from an analytic perspective, 
thus outlining the evolutionary trail of military intervention. An overview of the literature 
follows, where the earlier development of the interventionist debate will be discussed, as well 
as criteria for humanitarian intervention and its legal aspects. 
 
The crisis in Darfur started in February 2003 when two rebel groups emerged in Darfur to 
challenge the National Islamic Front (NIF) Government. The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) 
and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) claim that the Government of Sudan 
discriminates against Muslim African ethnic groups in Darfur and has methodically targeted 
these ethnic groups since the early 1990s.29 The Government of Sudan dismisses the SLA and 
JEM as terrorists. The conflict centres on the three African ethnic groups, the Fur, Zaghawa, 
and Massaleit, in opposition to nomadic Arab ethnic groups. Intermittent hostilities between 
the largely African-Muslim ethnic groups and the Arab inhabitants of Darfur can be traced 
back to the 1930s and most recently surfaced in the 1980s. Consecutive Governments in 
Khartoum have long neglected the African ethnic groups in Darfur and have done very little 
to prevent or contain attacks by Arab militias against non-Arabs in Darfur.30 
 
 
29
 International Coalition for the responsibility to protect Crisis in Darfur , available at 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisisindarfur (accessed 20 October 2012). 
30
 Williams PD  & Bellamy AJ  The responsibility to protect and the Crisis in Darfur Security 
Dialogue (2005) 36. 
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Addressing an audience at the Rwandan genocide  memorial in Geneva in 2004, former UN 
Secretary General Kofi Anna speaking of ethnic cleansing in Darfur, said that ‘the 
international community cannot stand idle’ in the face of such widespread human rights 
violations.31 In this address, Annan unequivocally referred to the mounting humanitarian 
crisis in Darfur, calling on the international community to take action.32 At the time when 
Annan delivered his speech, approximately 30 000 people were already dead and about a 
million had fled their homes, with 200 000 of those forced into refugee camps in Chad.33 The 
fact-finding missions sent into Darfur and Chad by the UN and Human Rights Watch 
provided further evidence of systematic crimes, killings, rape, and forced displacement 
perpetrated predominantly by the Sudanese Government and the Janjaweed militia.34 
According to the 1948 Genocide Convention,35 once the UN acknowledges that the goings on 
in that particular place amount to genocide, it has to act. The dilemma for the UN is that if it 
does act upon this, it may not receive the military, political and financial means it would need 
to act, from its member states. Thus has the potential to create a perception of illegitimacy. 
Notwithstanding differences, the UN Security Council has gradually called for greater UN 
involvement in the crisis.36 It can be argued that the UN is aware of its limitations in this 
crisis. 
 
Welsh holds the view that there is not always tension between state sovereignty and 
humanitarian intervention, because in some instances there have been no Government that 
could give consent as was in Somalia,37 or when indirect consent has been given by a 
Government that has realized its inability to prevent ongoing human suffering as was the case 
in Burundi.38 In the case of Darfur during 2006 and 2007, there were attempts to stem the 
 
31
 Kofi Annan’s address to the UN Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 7 April 2004, UN News Service, 
available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=10377   (accessed 12 October 2012). 
32
 Clough M Darfur: Whose responsibility to protect? Human Rights Watch, New York ( 5 March 2005) 
available at http://hrw.org/wr2k5/darfur/darfur.pdf  (accessed 5 October  2012). 
33
 Williams PD & Bellamy AJ The responsibility to protect and the Crisis in Darfur, note 30 above. 
34
  Slim H ‘Dithering Over Darfur? A Preliminary Review of the International Response International 
Affairs’ (2005) 80. 
35
 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948 and came into force on 12 January 1951. 
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violence, but ceasefires were not respected.39 An effort by the UN to establish a peacekeeping 
force to replace the AU force on station was rejected by the Sudanese Government, whose 
approval is needed before the implementation of any form of assistance. Additional 
suggestions on a composite force, consisting of both UN and African Union (AU) troops 
were also dismissed by Khartoum. It was not until the summer of 2007 that a UN force was 
allowed to enter Darfur, but violence continued in spite of this.40 In those cases where the 
state is unwilling or unable to fulfil its obligations, the international community has the 
responsibility to intervene and to reassert order. Under the RTP, in circumstances where the 
international community must intervene, it is not with the purpose of overthrowing a 
Government, but rather with the purpose of preventing or ending unneeded loss of life and 
establishing an order by which the state may continue to provide for human security.41 
 
The study by Welsh is similar to my mini-thesis since it also focuses on the legal aspects of 
the implementation of the RTP doctrine. Duner explains that the justification for 
humanitarian intervention is deeply rooted on moral and ethical arguments. He states that ‘a 
war is a just war if it is waged in defence of human rights’ thus humanitarian interventions 
are ethically justified in appropriate cases.’ 42 The author goes on to mention the ‘just cause’ 
threshold which is perhaps the most important requirement under the RTP. The International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has defined ‘just cause’ in very specific 
terms. These terms include: Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal 
intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability 
to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale ‘ethnic cleansing,’ actual or apprehended, 
whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, or acts of terror or rape.43 For intervention to 
be justified under the RTP a conflict must be able to meet these requirements.  
 
In relation to the Darfur crisis, O’Neill holds that the Sudanese Government has continually 
disregarded all attempts from the international community to halt these crimes against 
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humanity, and has showed a lack of political will to stop the killings.44 Instead, the 7000 
troops committed to providing protection to these citizens have proven inadequate when 
faced with the well-armed janjaweed militias.45 Regarding the just cause criteria, the current 
human rights situation in Darfur meets this requirement on the first prong; a large-scale loss 
of life exists within the Darfur region of Sudan, and the Sudanese Government has shown 
that it is unwilling to halt, or perhaps is implicit in the commission of these crimes. Thus, in 
this case, the just cause requirement has been met yet the UN Security Council has failed to 
take any decisive action to protect the people of Darfur while the opposite was done in the 
Libyan case.  
 
Rice calls for a repetition of Kosovo by the USA to solve the crisis in Darfur, where a 
humanitarian intervention should be launched even if a mandate cannot be obtained via the 
Security Council. Rice further states that a mandate should prove unlikely, since especially 
China has invested heavily in Sudan’s oil assets, and can veto any resolution.46 The action 
Rice supports should however preferably be multilateral, with support from NATO and the 
African Union if possible.47 South Africa’s position on the Darfur conflict has surprised and 
disappointed activists and officials calling for a strong international response to one of 
world’s most severe humanitarian and human rights crises.48 In 2006, for example South 
Africa opposed a resolution critical of Khartoum’s notorious conduct in Darfur, supporting 
instead a weaker resolution that excluded any reference to follow-up action by the Council 
and to the Sudanese Government’s duty to protect civilians.49 In 2007, in its capacity as a 
newly elected member of the UN Security Council, South Africa backed Sudan in rejecting 
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the option of sanctions against combatants who attack civilians and obstruct peace efforts and 
against parties to the conflict that refuse to co-operate with UNAMID, the UN-AU 
peacekeeping force in Darfur.50 
 
Hottinger mentions that the biggest obstacle in finding a solution in Darfur is lack of 
commitment from Washington.51 This is thought to stem from the fact that the USA does not 
want to risk their work in the settlement between southern Sudan and Khartoum. This means 
that Darfur has a lower priority in USA foreign policy towards Sudan. I agree in part with 
Hottinger’s notion on USA foreign policy towards Sudan but still the UN in its own capacity 
with the support of the member states can act. To date human rights violations continue in 
Darfur with no solution in sight and the sincerity of NATO’s intentions in the Libya 
campaign remains questionable.52 For example, why would NATO members rush into a 
military campaign to remove Gaddafi from power and not do the same in Darfur or Syria 
where civilians continue to be killed by incumbent regimes? Was Gaddafi a worse dictator 
than Al Assad in the Syrian case or Omar Al-Bashir. 
 
Prunier argues that a NATO led operation might lead to another Iraq or Somalia, where 
coalition forces would be bogged down for a long time with unsure chances of success. 
According to him there is no quick-fix solution to the problem as Sudan has a complex 
conflict which can be traced back a long time.53 The general debate regarding Darfur is not, 
therefore if there is a state-sanctioned humanitarian catastrophe taking place, as that has been 
established by most observers. It is rather a question about the method of choice by the 
international community in preventing this situation from continuing, with current practical 
support for a military intervention, other than peacekeeping forces, being low. 
 
The primary criticism of the RTP in its current form and its failure to resolve the Darfur crisis 
is that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are permitted to retain their 
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veto power in this issue.54 Although the document encourages the five permanent members to 
‘agree not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not 
involved,’ this suggestion is not binding.55 In a Council that is frequently divided because of 
the disputes between the five permanent members, it is highly possible that the exercise of 
veto power will subvert the Security Council’s ability to react effectively and appropriately to 
humanitarian crises.  
 
The Arab Spring struck Libya with all its force in the middle of February 2011. Protests 
against the decade-long rule of Gaddafi erupted on the Libyan streets, but were met with 
violence from the regime. The protests soon evolved into a civil war, and the better equipped 
Governmental forces, armed with tanks and aircrafts, were pitted against poorly armed and at 
times unarmed rebels. Gaddafi’s troops used excessive force when suppressing the rebellion, 
spurring a storm of protests from the international community.56  In response to this, the UN 
presented a resolution aimed at protecting the civilian population, Resolution 1973.57 This 
resolution authorized the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya and permitted the use of 
all necessary measures to protect civilians. 
 
The use of force in Libya to protect civilians also brought to the fore reservations against the 
enforcement of Pillar 3 of the RTP principle. While there is consensus on Pillar 1 which 
stipulates that each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Pillar 2 highlights the 
responsibility of the international community to assist states through capacity building other 
states that are willing, but weak and unable, to uphold their Pillar 1 of the responsibilities   
principles, it is the ambiguous and open-ended nature of the third pillar responsibility of the 
international community to take collective action in a timely and decisive manner.58 This then 
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prevents the international community from taking timely collective action.59 Pillar 3 includes 
responses both through pacific measures under Chapter VI and Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter and in the event of peaceful means proving to be inadequate, the Security Council 
can resort to coercive measures under Chapter VII. This is where the bone of contention lies, 
with consensus often lacking within the Council on the issue of when is the time ripe to 
sanction military intervention. 
 
Barkawi argues that it ‘reignited also the neo-conservative belief that democracy can be 
exported by military means’. He further adds that the possibility of military intervention in 
Libya setting a precedence should be viewed with concern because ‘it is becoming 
increasingly legitimate to use military power in the global South without taking responsibility 
for the political and human aftermath’.60 It is important to note that in the Libyan crisis 
peaceful means to resolve the standoff were not explored; those who voted for resolution 
1973 understood that they were voting for air strikes to protect civilians. The RTP doctrine 
promotes the use of force as the last resort. It is worth keeping in mind that the intervention 
was anything but a last resort. Sanctions, including an arms embargo, had hardly been put in 
place when the bombs began to fly. There was no attempt to use peaceful means to protect 
civilians such as gaining safe passage out of Benghazi.61 The rebels wanted no negotiation 
that might lead to Gaddafi stepping down in exchange for amnesty or a safe haven abroad.62 
The coalition became the fighting arm of the rebellion, installing a new regime amidst serious 
questions about their intentions and capabilities. 
 
Akonor suggests that the effectiveness of African solutions for African problems can 
certainly be questioned in the case of Libya.63 However, while the Libyan problem had grown 
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to proportions where civilians were no longer safe, it was not NATO that was supposed to 
intervene in Libya, rather, it was the AU. As correctly pointed out, ‘Article 4(h) of the AU act 
gives the AU the right to intervene forcibly in one of its member states with regards to war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’.64 I agree with Akonor’s view because when 
the AU presented a peaceful road map on a resolution on the Libyan crises it was ignored by 
various western states and the UN. 
 
Akonor further questions why the AU would go through the longer path via the UN when 
they could intervene directly in Libya. The major problem with the continental body is the 
insistence of its members on the respect of the territorial sovereignty of constituent countries. 
Instead of rushing to help the people of Libya under RTP and Article 4(h), the AU was busy 
defending values of sovereignty, independence and brotherhood. This type of action by the 
AU weakens the organisation and creates room for the more decisive groups like NATO to 
assume responsibility. In fact the AU could have lost the respect of the NTC as a result of its 
indecisiveness in taking action against Gaddafi. 65 I strongly agree with Akonor’s view 
because the heads of states of most African member states practice a similar leadership style 
as Gaddafi and supporting the AU ideology of sovereignty, independence and brotherhood 
will in future assist them in any intervention by the UN if they fail to protect their citizens. 
 
Smith’s view is that the intervention by western powers in the Libyan crisis was arguably 
initiated for profit making purposes. Being the country with the sixth largest oil reserves in 
the world, Libya became an automatic target for destabilisation, especially when there is so 
much competition for access to African resources between the US led western block on the 
one and China on the other hand.66 Libya’s historically hostile relationship with the west, 
worsened by involvement of the country’s secret agents in the Lockerbie airplane bombing, 
Gaddafi’s aborted nuclear weapons programme and his penchant for nationalisation, always 
pointed to a future of uncertainty, though relations had just begun to thaw somehow.67 It is 
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therefore not surprising that at the earliest opportunity, Gaddafi, undependable as he was, had 
to be taken out of the way.68 
 
Klein states that any military operation that is aimed primarily at regime change, even if that 
regime is guilty of gross human rights violations, cannot accurately be said to be in 
accordance with RTP. Military operations are only in accordance with the RTP if they are 
authorized by the UN Security Council and designed to prevent or halt the four mass atrocity 
crimes.69 Overthrow of a regime is not, in and of itself, a legitimate objective. However, 
disabling the capacity of Gaddafi’s regimes to harm its own people was seen by many as 
essential to discharging the mandate of protection. 
 
Cilliers and Sturman argue that sovereignty has often been used to protect leaders at the 
expense of citizens.70 The Constitutive Act of the AU allows for intervention without the 
approval of the target state in a way that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) system of 
absolute consensus never did. Guaranteeing that intervention is effectual is as imperative as 
the decision of when and why to intervene. Sanctions, criminal prosecutions and military 
interventions are the broad options available to the AU. The authors’ views are similar to 
mine in my analyses of the legality of the RTP since I questioned the effectiveness of the AU 
in regard to humanitarian intervention and its lack of affirmativeness on how intervention 
will be authorised as well as on mechanisms for its implementation. 
 
Harhoff states that some of the criteria for humanitarian intervention are that there is a 
massive, or large-scale and outrageous violation of international humanitarian standards 
committed against civilians during an internal conflict in a state.71 In addition Wheeler states 
that it is advantageous to ensure that a large number of the international community supports 
such an intervention in order to gather support instead of opposition to the intervention which 
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may lead to condemnation of the operation.72 Terry also contributed to the issue of criteria by 
mentioning that nations involved in the intervention can only target humanitarian abuses, 
addressing other political objectives or interests take an intervention out of humanitarian 
category.73 I agree with the authors because their above views are crucial to the centre of my 
mini-thesis because in investigating the inconsistencies of the application of RTP one must 
analyze the criterion of military intervention. 
 
1.9 Research Methodology 
The study was conducted using comparative desktop research. The information used was 
obtained from primary sources such as treaties, protocols, draft laws, reports, and relevant 
secondary sources, particularly text books, journal articles, internet resources and other 
materials that are relevant to humanitarian law with special focus on military intervention 
(RTP doctrine). In relation to the legality of the RTP a study of  legislation and case law was 
carried out.74 The UN Charter, more precisely Article 2(4) and Chapter VII, was starting 
point for the study of the legal status of humanitarian intervention. In addition, a study of 
various conventions and declarations adopted on the basis of human rights was conducted.75 
Reports by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty were also 
reviewed. This mini-thesis was not based on fieldwork or questionnaires. The forgiving   
literature review underscores what research has been done, thus demonstrating how 
intervening countries sanctioned intervention and demarcating how intervention has evolved. 
Contemporary literature on military intervention in intrastate conflicts also informs this study. 
 
1.10 Limitations and Potential Problems of Study 
This mini-thesis sets out to outline and probe the inconsistencies that exist in the 
implementation of the RTP principle and to evaluate as to what extent those inconsistencies 
are at. Two instances were selected where the RTP norm was applied, and where it failed to 
deliver on its mandate, namely the intervention during the Libyan crisis and the Darfur crisis 
that still continues to date with no stability in sight. In addition the mini-thesis focused on the 
study and analysis of the implementation of the RTP under international humanitarian law. It 
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has been chosen to rather limit this mini-thesis to intervention on humanitarian grounds and 
thus delve into the issue of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter thus the exploration into legal aspects of the RTP was limited. The 
focuses was on humanitarian interventions by the use of force and discuss intervention 
through peaceful means or other humanitarian actions of a more general character thus 
outlining the extent of inconsistencies in the application of the RTP.  
 
The mini-thesis therefore commence from the war in Kosovo, which effectively paved the 
way for NATO’s military humanitarian efforts but this analysis was brief because the primary 
locations of  the mini-thesis is the case of Libya and Darfur. The end of the examined period 
was the situation in Libya. During this time-span, the following events were examined:  
 
• The crisis in Darfur. This is due to the fact that this crisis has often been used as an 
argument where the RTP should either be used, or admit its defeat. There have been 
reports of ‘large-scale loss of life due to deliberate state action, neglect or inability to 
act, or a failed state situation’ 76 and voices arguing for a humanitarian intervention 
are in abundance.  
• The Arab Spring and especially Libya. This is because it has been another instance 
where NATO used force to prevent human suffering. The other countries affected by 
the revolutionary fervour could also be included, but to further restrict the number of 
actors limited the study to Libya.  
 
1.11 Structure of mini-thesis 
The mini-thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one covers the research problem, aim 
and methodology as well as some literature  on military intervention by delineating the 
concept of military intervention within the wider interventionist debate under the RTP 
doctrine. The second chapter of the mini-thesis presents the basic principles of the RTP 
through the spectrum of the international and regional legal frameworks. An examination of 
different philosophical viewpoints of the RTP and if it serves its purpose in its current form. 
The chapter raises and answers the first and second research questions identified above. 
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The third and fourth chapter raises and answers the third and fourth research questions posed 
above. Chapter three describes and the criteria for humanitarian intervention. Chapter four 
focuses on the implementation of the RTP doctrine. In other words, this chapter explores the 
actual implementation of the RTP and how it has been applied in the last two decades; this is 
done by making reference to numerous humanitarian crises cases. An analysis and evaluation 
of the evolution of the RTP is made in this chapter. The fifth and final chapter contains a 
conclusion and some recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The basic principles and legality of the RTP 
2.1 Introduction 
To respond to the research questions sufficiently, I have selected two case studies, these 
being the cases of Libya and Sudan. I selected these two cases from a practical point in order 
to support and prove my critical opinion that there is an inconsistency in the implementation 
of the RTP during humanitarian crises. The Libya and Sudan cases both occurred after the 
establishment of the RTP norm, yet in the case of Sudan the international community was 
very hesitant to react and intervene using the RTP norm. In the Libya case, however, the 
international community was not hesitant at all to make use of the norm. The cases thus show 
important similarities and differences which makes the comparison very interesting. This 
chapter seeks to outline the basic principles of the RTP doctrine and discuss the legality of 
the doctrine as well as how it has been applied. 
 
2.2 The basic principles of the RTP 
The RTP doctrine is based on the idea that sovereignty is not a privilege, but a responsibility 
which focuses on preventing and halting four core crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.77 The RTP can be thought of as having three parts. 
Firstly, ‘a state has a responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing’.78 states will still have control over their own 
territories. Secondly, ‘if the state is unable to protect its population on its own, the 
international community has a responsibility to assist the state by building its capacity’. This 
is still within the boundaries of state sovereignty. Thirdly, ‘if a state is manifestly failing to 
protect its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures are not working, the 
international community has the responsibility to intervene first diplomatically or 
economically, and as a last resort with military force’.79 
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2.2 Elements of RTP 
The three elements of RTP as outlined in the ICISS report are the responsibility to prevent, 
the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild. According to the Commission, the 
responsibility to prevent is the most important element of RTP. The responsibility to prevent 
lies first with the sovereign states and the local communities within those states. However, 
when needed and appropriate the international community should offer support to these 
efforts. The argument behind prevention is that it helps to eliminate the need for intervention 
at a later stage which will save lives and precious resources. 80  
 
2.2.3 Prevention as a first element of RTP 
The first element of the RTP is developing more robust early warning systems. The 
Commission acknowledges that there are Non-Governmental organizations, such as the 
International Crisis Group (ICG), that are exclusively devoted to conflict analysis and 
providing early warnings to policy makers. However, early warning systems need to be far 
more standardized, and the UN and regional bodies should have permanent and coordinated 
early warning systems in place.81 When analyzing the first element of the RTP it is 
noteworthy that: 
‘Firstly, there has to be knowledge of the vulnerability of the situation and the risks associated 
with it so called ‘early warning’. Secondly, there has to be understanding of the policy 
measures available that are capable of making a difference the so-called ‘preventive toolbox’. 
And thirdly, there has to be, as always, the willingness to apply those measures the issue of 
‘political will.’82  
In this fragment on the responsibility to prevent it is worth noting that in most instances it is 
the lack of political will and not the lack of information as the main problem for example the 
atrocities in Sudan are well documented. 
 
There should be efforts at both the national and international level to address root causes of 
conflict, which can include marginalization of minorities, violation of political and human 
rights, and poverty. Prevention of the root causes of conflict may involve addressing political 
needs, economic deprivation, strengthening legal institutions, and making structural reforms 
to the military. Political reform may involve capacity building assistance, facilitating power-
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sharing deals, and supporting freedom of the press and civil society. In terms of economic 
reform, the ICISS specifically cites international trade reform and access to major markets for 
developing nations in addition to traditional development assistance. Legal reform involves a 
standard set of activities, such as strengthening the judiciary and rule of law in addition to 
fostering the development of robust legal protections for marginalized groups. Finally, 
security sector reform may also fall under efforts designated as prevention and can involve 
any number of activities from professional development education for officers, 
demobilization programs, and tightened control over weapons.83 
 
Even though military prevention measures form part of prevention under the RTP elements, 
this is solemnly utilized when implementing the RTP norm. This can take place in the form 
of deployment of a UN Preventative Force. An example of such an endeavour is in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, where a preventative force has been successfully deployed to 
help keep the peace by the UN since 2005. All of these measures aim to prevent conflict and 
mass atrocities before they occur, but in the event that preventative measures fail, RTP 
mandates that the international community must react and put a stop to atrocities.84 
 
2.2.4 Responsibility to react as second element of RTP 
The RTP clearly states that a responsibility to react is vital to situations of undeniable need 
for human protection. When preventive measures fail to resolve or control the situation and 
when a Government is unable or unwilling to rectify or restore the situation, then 
interventionary measures by other members of the international community of states may be 
required. These coercive measures may include political, economic or judicial measures and 
only in severe cases they may also include military action. As a matter of principle, in the 
case of reaction just as with prevention, less intrusive and coercive measures should always 
be considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied such as military 
intervention.85 
 
Political and diplomatic sanctions are the first stage of measures that can be taken to react to 
a crisis. Broad sanctions can hurt already vulnerable populations, so targeted sanctions 
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against individuals or perhaps sanctions against certain industries that are known to be 
fuelling the conflict are viewed as the better option,86 such as in the case of  Liberia were the 
country was engaged in a civil war from 1989 to 2003. In 2000, the UN accused Liberian 
president Charles G. Taylor of supporting the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) insurgency 
in neighbouring Sierra Leone with weapons and training in exchange for diamonds.87 In 
2001, the UN applied sanctions on the Liberian diamond trade with Resolution 1343 of 7 
March 2001.88 
 
The responsibility to react as second element of the RTP norm promotes the use of sanctions, 
but it is vital to outline that this is very difficult to enforce and requires broad international 
support. On rare occasions there is at times adequate consensus within the international 
community to impose universal sanctions. For example, under Security Council Resolution 
1591 there is a Sudan Sanctions Committee that is responsible for monitoring a UN imposed 
arms embargo on Darfur and also has the power to impose targeted sanctions against 
individuals. To date, and despite the terrible nature of the crisis and levels of violence in 
Darfur, the Committee has only designated four individuals for asset freezes and travel bans 
under the authority given to them in Resolution 1591.89 
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2.2.5 Criteria for military intervention under the RTP 
In the event where the international community has attempted to utilize all the other measures 
but has failed to end the human suffering or end human rights violation the ICISS 
recommends that military action should be utilized to save human lives, but only in extreme 
cases and when certain other criteria have been met. Six criteria must be taken into account 
when considering the possibility of military intervention. These are as follows:  
i. the right authority,  
ii. just cause,  
iii. right intention, 
iv.  last resort, 
v.  proportional means, and  
vi. reasonable prospects of success. 90  
 
There are very few circumstances where military action would be justified and therefore meet 
the just cause criteria, and these are large-scale loss of life including genocide, mass killings, 
or ethnic cleansing (genocidal intent is not relevant).  
 
These situations that fall under the just cause criteria include crimes defined in the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,91 crimes against humanity or war 
crimes as defined by the Geneva Conventions, state collapse leading to civil war or mass 
starvation, or overwhelming natural disasters.92 Right authority entails authorization from the 
UN Security Council, which is designed to ensure that the intervention is being undertaken 
with the right intentions. It should be noted that ICISS only goes so far as to state that in ideal 
circumstances UN approval will be given. However, in subsequent discussions regarding 
RTP it is inferred that any intervention would have to be authorized by the UN Security 
Council.  
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Meeting the criterion of right intention essentially mandates that there can be no ulterior 
motive for intervention beyond relieving humanitarian suffering and promoting international 
security. In order to meet the last resort criterion there must be no reasonable expectation that 
other measures, such as sanctions or diplomatic negotiations, could end the conflict. Taking 
to account the last resort criteria on the Sudan case, the UN Security Council placed 
numerous sanctions on the Sudanese Government yet failed to implement further action, such 
as military intervention under the RTP norm, to stop human rights violations that continue to 
take place in the Darfur region of Sudan. On 30 July 2004 the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution1556 (2004), imposing sanctions on Sudan in response to the ongoing 
humanitarian crisis and widespread human rights violations, including continued attacks on 
civilians. These sanctions were later modified and strengthened with the adoption of  
Resolution 1591 (2005),93 which expanded the scope of the arms embargo and imposed 
additional measures including a travel ban and an assets freeze on individuals such as 
President of Sudan Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir. 
 
The enforcement of the arms embargo was strengthened by Resolution 1945 (2010).94 Even 
though the Government of Sudan has continued its hostile behaviour towards its people, no 
military intervention has occurred. This is in contrast to the situation in Libya where just after 
a few months of non-compliance by the Government of Gaddafi, military intervention 
occurred. This clearly displays the inconsistency in the implementation of the RTP doctrine.  
Ultimately, the intervention must involve proportional means and follow all norms of 
humanitarian law, and there must be a reasonable belief among policy-makers that 
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intervention will succeed in ending suffering and perhaps more importantly will not escalate 
or enlarge the crisis.95 It is vital to note that ICISS does not stipulate any parameters for how 
to determine if the ‘reasonable prospects for success’ criteria is met which leaves the criteria 
to the interpretation of whoever wishes to implement such intervention and leaves it open to 
misuse. The language on the appropriate response to mass atrocities defined by ICISS was 
well considered. It is meant to change the tone of the humanitarian intervention debate and 
move away from the extreme of either upholding sovereignty or basic humanitarian 
principles. Therefore when an RTP situation comes before the UN Security Council, the 
members  of the Council, especially the five permanent members, will have to publicly 
defend their positions.96 By creating standard benchmarks for action, ICISS believed states 
could be more effectively pressured by the public and other players in the international 
community to respond in a decisive and timely manner.97 
 
The hypothesis made by ICISS is that if states are presented with the facts of a crisis, the 
international community will come to a unified position.98 Sadly this has not been the case. 
For example, while the AU had a clear peaceful diplomatic road map to the Libyan crisis, the 
UN Security Council and NATO opted for a more aggressive approach to resolve the crises 
which was military intervention. In addition, even if states agree on the facts of a situation, 
there is not a reasonable expectation that states will agree on the threshold criteria.99 There 
could be difference in schools of thoughts over the criteria of last resort and reasonable 
prospects. The element of the responsibility to react is very controversial and will remain so 
for years to come. 
 
2.2.6 The final element of RTP- Responsibility to rebuild 
The final element of RTP, responsibility to rebuild, is more widely embraced by the majority 
of states. The international community should aid with rebuilding if needed and close 
cooperation with local people. This may mean staying in the country for some time after the 
initial purposes of the intervention have been accomplished. Too often in the past the 
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responsibility to rebuild has been insufficiently recognized, the exit of the interveners has 
been poorly managed and the commitment to help with reconstruction has been inadequate. 
Countries have also found themselves at the end of the day still wrestling with the underlying 
problems that produced the original intervention action. It is of great importance to note that 
there is an increased responsibility if a military intervention has taken place. The ICISS 
outlines the three areas that need to be addressed in a rebuilding effort; these include security, 
judicial processes, and development.100 Making reference to the Libyan case; retaliation 
attacks, 101 torture, and random arrests remain pervasive on the part of both Gaddafi loyalists 
and opposition forces, further undermining the responsibility to rebuild and constructive 
reconciliation attempts. The establishment of an independent investigative commission, as 
envisaged by the TNC along the lines of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation process, 
will be paramount in holding perpetrators of abuses accountable, compensating victims, and 
healing the wounds of a bitter past.   
 
2.3 The Legality of the RTP 
The legality of the RTP is a sensitive matter. It is worth noting that the RTP is only a political 
non-binding norm and not legally binding under international law. The exercise of the RTP 
depends on the kindness of the international community, regional organizations and 
individual member states.  The  failure to adequately respond to the most atrocious crimes 
against humanity leads to a special and important commitment to protect the human 
population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing taken by world leaders during  the 
United Nations 2005 World Summit. The international community was convinced that it 
could no longer ignore the changing conditions of wars and crimes against humanity.102  
There is still much opposition against the RTP legality. Those opposed to the legality of the 
RTP doctrine remain convinced that humanitarian intervention should remain illegal, because 
of the principle of state sovereignty (as stated by the World Summit, General Assembly, the 
Security Council and the UN Secretariat) must be respected. 
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2.3.1 The idea of state sovereignty as outlined in UN charter 
Sovereignty has come to signify the legal identity of a state in international law. It is a 
concept which provides order, stability and predictability in international relations since 
sovereign states are regarded as equal, regardless of size or wealth. The principle of sovereign 
equality of states is enshrined in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter. Internally, sovereignty 
signifies the capacity to make authoritative decisions with regard to the people and resources 
within the territory of the state.103 Generally, however, the authority of the state is not 
regarded as absolute, but constrained and regulated internally by constitutional power sharing 
arrangements.104 A condition of any one state’s sovereignty is a corresponding obligation to 
respect every other state’s sovereignty. This is embodied in the norm of non-intervention as 
enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.  
 
A sovereign state is empowered in international law to exercise exclusive and total 
jurisdiction within its territorial borders.105 There are exceptional arrangements between 
states for cases of completing jurisdiction; other states have the corresponding duty not to 
intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. If that duty is violated, the victim state 
has the further right to defend its territorial integrity and political independence. For example, 
the consensus in international law is that a state does not have any obligation to surrender an 
alleged criminal to a foreign state, because one principle of sovereignty is that every state has 
legal authority over the people within its borders. Such absence of international obligation, 
and the desire for the right to demand such criminals from other countries, has caused a web 
of extradition treaties or agreements to evolve. When there is no extradition agreement in 
place, or when applicable extradition agreements are inapplicable, a sovereign may still 
request the expulsion or lawful return of an individual pursuant to the requested state’s 
domestic law. This can be accomplished through the immigration laws of the requested state 
or other facets of the requested state’s domestic law. Similarly, the penal procedure codes in 
many countries contain provisions allowing for extradition to take place in the absence of an 
extradition agreement. Sovereigns may, therefore, still request the expulsion or lawful return 
of a fugitive from the territory of a requested state in the absence of an extradition treaty. In 
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the era of decolonization, the sovereign equality of states and the correlative norm of non-
intervention received its most emphatic affirmation from the newly independent states. The 
UN Charter in Article 2(7) seems to be clear. It states: 
‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially the domestic jurisdiction of any state’.  
 
Yet an appeal to Chapter VII of the UN Charter has allowed the UNSC to facilitate 
intervention in the interest of international peace and security. The recent UN-supported 
actions taken against Bosnia,106 Libya,107 and Somalia108 are supported by this point of 
view.109 
 
Even though both the UNSC and the UN Secretariat advocate for respect for sovereignty, this 
is not an absolute right. States can only enjoy full sovereignty on condition they respect and 
protect the human rights of their civilians within the boundaries of their state. When the state 
fails to do so, then its sovereignty can be temporarily interfered with for the sake of 
international peace and security until the situation improves. The international community 
has a duty to protect and support other states in maintaining their commitment to their 
civilians and otherwise engage in the situation to change it for the better.110 However, neither 
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the 2001 Report nor the 2005 Resolution on the RTP are legally binding documents. The RTP 
doctrine is strictly speaking a political agreement and not yet a legally binding norm.111 
 
In addition, the RTP norm as articulated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome addresses some 
of these legality requirements, but falls short on others. The inclusion of the RTP in the 
World Summit Outcome serves some aspects of the promulgation requirement. While it did 
not promulgate the norm into law, it did publicize the foundations upon which a legal norm 
would grow and set the parameters for further normative debate.112 In turn, the fact that the 
World Summit Outcome tied the RTP to a set of established international crimes speaks to a 
number of the legality requirements. Compared to the formulations of triggering events in the 
ICISS and High Level Panel reports, the World Summit Outcome’s linking of the 
responsibility to existing legal categories significantly enhances the clarity of the triggering 
events and scope of the norm. 
 
2.3.2 Threat to peace under UN Charter 
Chapter VII of the UN charter provides the legal basis for military intervention by the UNSC 
in situations where a ‘threat to peace’, a ‘breach of the peace’ or an ‘act of aggression’ is at 
hand.113 According to Article 24(1) of the Charter the UNSC carries out the responsibility of 
maintaining international peace and security on behalf of the member states and decisions 
taken by the UNSC is binding upon the member states.114 Affirmative votes of nine of its 
fifteen members including the concurring votes of the Permanent members; the USA,115 the 
United Kingdom, France, China and Russia,116 is needed to reach a decision within the 
UNSC.117 However, established practice indicates that abstention by one or more Permanent 
Members does not prevent a decision from being made.118 
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When a serious situation has arisen posing a possible threat to international peace and 
security, a series of decisions must be addressed by the UNSC. According to Article 39 of the 
UN Charter, the existence of a ‘threat to peace’, ‘a breach of the peace’ or an ‘act of 
aggression’ needs to be decided upon in addition to what would be appropriate measures in 
response to the situation at hand. Non-military measures such as economic sanctions may be 
sufficient and are always preferred as the initial form of intervention. According to Article 41 
of the UN Charter when referring to necessary measures this could also include the use of 
military force.119 In accordance with Article 42 of the UN Charter, military force is only to be 
used when non-military measures ‘would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate’. If 
military enforcement action is decided upon, Article 43 stipulates that special agreements are 
to provide the UNSC with the forces necessary to carry out the action. For example The 
African Union and UN Hybrid operation in Darfur, referred to by its acronym UNAMID was 
established on 31 July 2007 with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1769.120 
 
Legal scholars such as Damrosch argue that using the UN Charter’s Article 39 ‘threat to the 
peace,’ as a justification of the RTP military intervention is questionable because massive 
human rights violations do not necessarily entail threats to peace and security.121 Instead 
economic sanctions and other non-forcible measures are quite acceptable methods for 
enforcement of the full range of international human rights law, whether or not the human 
rights violations in question endanger international security. Yet in practice such measures 
are always overlooked for military intervention as was the case in Libya. Advocates of the 
RTP have claimed the legality of the doctrine by the magnanimous interpretation of Article 
39 of the UN Charter.  
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Generally the legality of the RTP doctrine begs the question of: which of the two is more 
important: Sovereignty or human rights? The RTP gives priority to human rights and 
contradicts the Westphalia norm of sovereignty by claiming that sovereignty is not absolute 
and binding, but a privilege that states earn when they protect their civilians.122 The ICISS 
stated: ‘The RTP has come to be seen as an instrument that can strengthen the capacity of 
weak states to fulfil their sovereign responsibilities to their own citizens’.123 It is vital to 
mention that in the RTP doctrine we have such a norm in which the international community 
can act when gross human rights violations occur, but in practice we hardly apply the RTP in 
its intended form. 
 
2.3.3 The African Union and the RTP 
From the onset the AU displayed massive determination towards bettering the lives of the 
African people especially when it came to human rights violation. Unlike their predecessor 
the organisation of OAU which lacked both the statutory authority and institutional capacity 
to intervene in matters related to peace and security. This was apparent with their failure to 
intervene in the tyranny of Idi Amin’s Uganda in the late 1970s and the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide. In addition the OAU further failed to address human rights violations in the 
continent by their support for and emphasis on the principles of national sovereignty and non-
interference. The AU demonstrates a fundamental shift from the OAU policy of non-
interference to one that embraces international co-operation and recognises the superiority of 
the UN Charter in peace and security. 124 It has also adopted various engagement alternatives, 
from mediation, to using force to intervene in specific circumstances. 
 
The AU exhibited significant support for the RTP when through Article 4(h) of its 
Constitutive Act  it institutionalised the AU’s right to intervene in a member state ‘in respect 
of grave circumstances: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’. In addition, as 
members of the UN,125 African states have also endorsed the RTP principle in the General 
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Assembly’s World Summit Outcome Document (2005) and, more recently,126 in Security 
Council Resolution 1674 (28 April 2006).127 
 
To further display their determination towards promoting peace, security, and stability on the 
continent, the AU amended the Constitutive Act to introduce a new ground of intervention by 
recognising the rights of the AU to intervene upon the recommendation of the Peace and 
Security Council when there is a serious threat to legitimate order,128 for the purpose of 
restoring peace and stability in a member state of the AU.129 Commentators have criticised 
the amendment, especially in regards to the meaning of the phrase ‘serious threats to 
legitimate order’, contrasting the justifications of war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide,130 the definitions of which are provided for in the statutes of the international 
criminal tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia.131 They have further been clarified by the 
jurisprudence of these two tribunals. However the concept on intervention justified by a 
serious threat to legitimate order is not defined anywhere.132 It can therefore be assumed that 
a legitimate order can only result from a free and fair election which allows the majority to 
determine whom they wish to govern them. However, what constitutes a free and fair election 
is itself a highly debatable issue in the African continent. One can cite a classical example is 
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Zimbabwe’s 2002 presidential elections and this bears testimony to the contentious nature of 
what constitutes free and fair elections in Africa.133  
 
The events in Kenya following the 2007 presidential elections provide another illustration to 
this debate.134  Adding to the controversy is the question relating to what constitutes a threat 
to legitimate order.  Are peaceful demonstrations by people demanding political changes to 
be considered a threat to legitimate order justifying intervention by the AU? This begs the 
question of whether this provision could have helped President François Bozizé the former 
president of Central African Republic or Gaddafi former president of Libya when rebels 
attempted to topple them from power to get assistance from the AU, in order to crush 
uprisings against their regimes.135 
 
It is also a matter of concern that the RTP within the African context is vulnerable to 
exploitation in order to legitimise the pursuit of the self-interest of western states and former 
colonial masters are often economically and politically powerful, as well as military stronger. 
Poor and failing states in the African continent often fall prey to interventionist tendencies 
disguised under the RTP. It can be argued, from this perspective that the supposed universal 
humanitarian values amount to nothing less than the new scramble for African resources by 
western states.136 For example, after the NATO military intervention in Libya scores of 
Western companies received deals in the oil sector from the new regime.137 In summary even 
though the AU seems to embrace the RTP they have not been able to fully internalise the 
doctrine to the degree that the organisation is willing to challenge the sovereignty of one or 
more of its powerful members; even if that member has engaged in norm violating behaviour. 
Undoubtedly, such a stance is not limited to the AU only. Despite a draft of UN Security 
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Council resolutions passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, no state has seriously acted 
toward humanitarian intervention in Darfur. In this sense, the RTP principle has yet to be 
fully internalised anywhere in the world. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The legality of the RTP as seen from the preceding paragraphs is a highly debatable concept. 
The UN Charter and the Constitutive Act of the AU make mention of a duty to intervene, but 
fail to list humanitarian grounds as one of the reasons for intervention. Both instruments lists 
threat to global peace and security as a ground for intervention, with the AU Constitutive Act 
going further to list the existence of a serious threat to legitimate order as a ground for 
intervention after recommendation from the Peace and Security Council. Human rights 
violations do not necessarily entail a threat to international peace and security and there is 
therefore no need for military intervention. Economic and other non-forcible measures can be 
employed. The absence of humanitarian grounds in the UN Charter and the Constitutive Act 
of the AU as justification for intervention in the international affairs of a state does not, 
legally speaking, grants it legality. In other words, legally speaking, the right to intervene on 
humanitarian ground do not exist. Chapter 3 will examine the implementation of the RTP 
further by exploring the case of Sudan and the role played by the UN and AU in terms of 
conflict resolution. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3. The Sudan case: Failed intervention or inappropriate application of RTP? 
The previous chapters have largely expounded on the RTP doctrine and outlined the core 
principles and elements of the doctrine. In the light of the research questions posed in the first 
chapter, the current chapter takes on the debate of the implementation of the RTP further by 
exploring the case of Sudan and the role played by both the UN and AU in terms of conflict 
resolution. In other words this chapter assesses how the RTP doctrine was implemented in 
this particular case.  
3.1 Background to the Sudan Conflict 
The crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan became violent in 2003. However, tensions had been 
festering for years because of the political and economic marginalization of western Sudan by 
the Government in Khartoum. The starting date of the conflict is hard to determine as the 
underlying causes have been there for a long time, especially the question regarding 
resources. As with the conflict in the south which recently led to the creation of South Sudan, 
the principal issue was that Khartoum seized the revenues from the resource-rich parts of the 
country.138 During 2003 the rebels managed to score several important victories against the 
Governmental army, forcing the regime in Khartoum to rethink its strategy. The Government 
in Khartoum responded brutally by deliberately undertaking a campaign to ethnically cleanse 
African tribes.139 In response to the attacks by the Darfur rebel groups, the Government 
launched counter-attacks against civilian populations using both conventional military forces 
and local Arab militias. In fact the Sudanese Government was reported to be privately 
funding the Arab rebel groups with arms.140 The Government would equip the Arab militias, 
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and they would ride into a village and destroy anything left after the completion of a 
Government aerial bombardment.141 
 
The consequences of this violence for the people of Darfur have been catastrophic. Deaths 
resulting from the conflict have been estimated at anywhere from 300 000 to 500 000 and 2.8 
million Darfuris have fled their homes due to conflict.142 It has been difficult for 
humanitarian workers to maintain a constant presence in the region because of harassment by 
the Government.143 In addition, the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situations in many 
parts of Darfur led to outright shortages in basic supplies, such as food and medicine.144 
Beyond the immense tragedy of the loss of lives is the loss of livelihoods. When the militias 
sweep into villages they methodically burn homes and agricultural land, poison wells, destroy 
food stocks, and kill livestock. These actions represent the destruction of all the resources that 
villagers have amassed over generations and will make it immensely difficult for them to 
adequately provide for themselves and their families.145 
 
The humanitarian situation has been further exasperated due to food shortages caused by the 
conflict, and there have been reports that the Sudanese Government relocated Arab 
populations to areas and settlements previously occupied by other groups.146 The former 
residents had been driven away by Government forces and Janjaweed rebel groups supported 
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by the state and became internally displaced persons.147 An AU force has been stationed in 
Darfur for 9 years, after being first deployed in June 2004.148 
 
As a result of all the atrocities committed by the Sudanese Government on 4 March 2009, 
ICC judges issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan al Bashir. The 
warrant holds that there are reasonable grounds to believe Bashir is criminally responsible for 
five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes.149 The charges relate to 
alleged attacks by Sudanese security forces and pro-Government militia in the Darfur region 
of Sudan during the Government’s six-year counter-insurgency campaign.150 The ICC 
warrant states that there are reasonable grounds to believe attacks against civilians in Darfur 
were a core component of the Sudanese Government’s military strategy, which involved 
attacks which were widespread and systematic, and that Bashir acted as an indirect 
perpetrator.151 Regardless of the initiatives shown by the AU notably by deploying troops to 
restore a secure situation throughout Darfur, underpinned by a political settlement and 
allowing a safe environment for the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 
refugees; 152 the support of organisations such as the EU and NATO which helped the AU 
expand its peacekeeping mission in Darfur by providing airlift for transport of additional 
peacekeepers into the region and by training AU personnel, 153 the international response to 
curb the violence in Darfur has been ineffective. The international presence on the ground is 
still insufficient and the violent continues.154 
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3.2 International response to and debate on the crisis in Darfur 
At first, the Darfur crisis was ignored by the international community for almost a year. 
There was barely any reaction on the part of the international community, which had 
constantly misconstrued the Sudanese armed conflict, interpreting it to be a religious conflict 
and not a racial one.155  
 
South Africa is viewed as a leader in the African continent and has placed itself in pole 
position as a role model of democracy. During the leadership of former president Thabo 
Mbeki the position of the ANC Government in South Africa seemed to be silent and did very 
little with regards to condemning the inhumane deeds the Sudanese Government was 
committing in Darfur.  Many in the west have easily pointed out that if Africans themselves 
care less about African victims of the Darfur catastrophe, why should the rest of the world 
care.156 For example Abdelbagi Jibril, Executive Director of the Darfur Relief and 
Documentation Centre, laments as follows: ‘Because of its glorious history, the position of 
the ANC Government in South Africa, in support of the crimes the Sudanese Government 
continues to commit in Darfur, disturbs the victims of this tragedy more than the positions of 
China, Egypt, Algeria, Russia and other friends of Sudan.157  
 
South Africa’s position on the Darfur conflict has disappointed the international community 
especially those who were calling for a strong international response to what has been called 
the world’s most severe humanitarian and human rights crises. In the past in the UN Human 
Rights Council, South Africa has consistently tried to weaken efforts to address this conflict; 
for example: in 2006, South Africa opposed a resolution critical of Khartoum’s notorious 
conduct in Darfur, supporting instead a weaker resolution that excluded any reference to 
follow-up action by the Council and to the Sudanese Government’s duty to protect 
civilians.158 In 2007, in its capacity as a newly elected member of the UNSC, South Africa 
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backed Sudan in rejecting the option of sanctions against combatants who attack civilians and 
obstruct peace efforts and against parties to the conflict that refuse to co-operate with 
UNAMID,159 the UN-AU peacekeeping force in Darfur.160 On face value, South Africa’s 
position during that time on Darfur and relations with Sudan might have seemed confusing 
and inappropriate, inconsistent with South Africa’s historical struggle against oppression, its 
constitutional values and its foreign policy commitment to the promotion of human rights and 
democracy.161 
 
Many scholars and supporters of the RTP have called for a stronger response by the 
international community in response to the situation in Darfur, 162 some even going so far as 
to argue that the RTP norm should be utilized as a full military intervention regardless of 
Khartoum’s objections.163 Susan Rice, the US Ambassador to the UN called for a repetition 
of Kosovo styled intervention by the USA, where a humanitarian intervention should be 
launched even if a mandate cannot be obtained via the UNSC.164  This suggestion by Rice 
would seem unlikely, since the likes of China have invested heavily in Sudan’s oil assets,165 
and can veto any resolution at the UNSC.166 In fact in 2007, China blocked efforts by the 
USA and other Western countries to sanction Sudan over Darfur crisis, claiming pressure and 
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sanctions will not help resolve problems- but trade would.167 The only way Rice’s suggestion 
could work is through multilateral arrangements, with support from NATO and the AU if 
possible. In contrast to Rice, Prunier is of the view that a military intervention using the RTP 
would do more damage than good in Darfur.168 According to him a NATO led operation 
might lead to another Iraq or Somalia, where coalition forces would be shattered with little 
chance of success. Overall it can be stated that there is no quick-fix to the problem as Sudan 
has a complex conflict which can be traced back a long time. 
 
3.3 Analysis of Darfur based on the Precautionary Principles of RTP 
It is vital that a method be formulated to analyse various cases of human rights abuses and 
also to determine if intervention using RTP, especially the use of non-consensual military 
force is necessary. When addressing the case of Darfur, I opted to focus on five principles 
stipulated by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, that must 
be met for a non-consensual military intervention to be a viable option and if the Darfur 
situation meets these conditions.169 
 
3.3.1 The Principle of seriousness of Harm 
On this principle, one must ask if the harm to a certain population of the nation is serious 
enough to warrant a military intervention under the RTP and if the situation has raised to the 
level of one of the four crimes namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
crimes of aggression? 170 
 
3.3.1.1   The Principle of Proper Purpose 
The question under this principle is does any military intervention have the right intention 
behind it? This means that the primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives 
intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is 
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better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the 
victims concerned (the Sudanese people).171 
 
Genocide should be the most heinous of war crimes, and the easiest to prevent and prosecute. 
But whether acts are classified and persecuted as genocidal depends upon a careful parsing of 
Articles II and III of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. 
Article II describes two elements of the crime of genocide: (1) the mental element, meaning 
the ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such,’ and (2) the physical element, including killing members of a group, causing serious 
bodily or  mental harm to members of a group, deliberately inflicting on a group conditions 
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or part, imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within a group, and forcibly transferring children of one group to 
another.172  
 
A war crime must include both 1 and 2 to be called ‘genocide.’ Article III of the Genocide 
Convention describes five punishable forms of the crime of genocide: genocide; conspiracy 
to commit genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; any attempt to commit 
the act; and complicity in genocidal acts.173 The Genocide Convention protects national, 
ethnical, racial, and religious groups, with each group being listed in the Convention. Intent 
to engage in genocidal acts may be inferred from a pattern of coordinated Acts, however 
difficult to prove. Moreover, intent is construed as being not necessarily the same as 
motivation. It is the intent to commit the acts and the commission of the acts that are critical. 
Admittedly, ‘intent’ is difficult to prove. Indeed, the UN’s International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur found it taxing, unlike the lawyers of the Bush administration and the USA 
Congress, to demonstrate ‘intent’ in Darfur and thus to sustain a probable indictment of 
genocide.174 Likewise, if   Pol Pot were merely killing fellow Cambodians with little interest 
in their ancestries, perhaps the horrific killing fields there technically did not breach the 
Genocide Convention because no specific internal group was being targeted for destruction. 
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When critically analysing the situation in Darfur the first and second principles apply. The 
situation in Darfur qualifies as genocide and gross human rights violations continue. The 
Rome Statute defines the crime of genocide as any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group:  
• Killing members of the group;  
• Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
• Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part;  
• Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
• Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.175  
 
During 2004 and 2005, the UNSC received monthly reports about violence on the ground 
(involving the burning of villages, massacres of civilians including women and children, 
rape, and forced displacement) and adopted several resolutions condemning the violence, 
calling for negotiations, commending the efforts of the AU, and urging member states to 
provide the AU with resources, but largely stopped short of becoming directly engaged on the 
ground. There were two notable exceptions to this pattern, however. One was the 
establishment in September 2004 of an international commission of inquiry to determine 
whether genocide and crimes against humanity were being committed in Darfur, a step that 
would set off the chain of events leading to the UNSC referral of Sudan to the ICC in March 
2005,176 and the subsequent indictment by the ICC of several Sudanese leaders, including, in 
March 2009, of its president. The other, with little practical impact but with some symbolic 
meaning, was the imposition of sanctions. As always, the inner-dynamics of the UNSC were 
no simple matter. Members were largely in agreement that atrocities in Darfur were 
unacceptable. Most were willing to express this sentiment in statements and resolutions. But 
as far as taking measures went, significant differences quickly surfaced. China had invested 
in Sudan over recent years and maintained a lot of business interests in the country, especially 
as a purchaser of Sudanese oil, so it was no surprise that she quickly emerged as the strongest 
advocate of a softly-softly approach. Russia was also largely reluctant to take strong 
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measures against Sudan. Islamic members at the time, Algeria and Pakistan, in 2004 only 
tended to show solidarity with Khartoum.177  
 
Thus, these countries abstained on resolutions which packed more of a punch, such as the 
establishment of the investigation into Darfur atrocities, sanctions and the eventual referral of 
Sudan to the ICC (on this last resolution, Russia voted in favour, while the US abstained due 
to the Bush administration’s strong aversion towards the international court). Algeria was 
initially reluctant to acknowledge a problem in Darfur (among the speakers in the debate 
during which the UNSC adopted its very first Darfur resolution in June 2004, Algeria was the 
only country that didn’t so much as utter the word).178 During its remaining time on the 
Security Council, Algeria tended to abstain on resolutions introducing specific measures, and 
was probably the Council member who was most vocal in supporting the view that Darfur 
was an African issue, backing the AU first and foremost, as well as respecting the views of 
the Sudanese Government.179 The political narrative began to change after a few months. 
Initially, the situation in Darfur was largely seen as a campaign by the Government and its 
allies against the civilian population of the region in which the rebel movement played only a 
marginal role. Gradually, however, developments in Darfur started being seen more as a 
classic, symmetrical conflict for which mediation would be the most appropriate tool, and a 
peace agreement the ultimate goal, with accountability becoming a much less central issue. 
 
The North-South agreement was signed in early 2005 and a few months later a UN 
peacekeeping operation in Sudan known as UNMIS was established to facilitate 
implementation. With atrocities continuing in Darfur and with the AU’s Darfur mission 
proving manifestly unable to provide the desired levels of protection, by late 2005 some 
Council members (mostly Western, with some African support), began suggesting a 
transition from the AU to a UN operation and the creation of a single UN mission that would 
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cover all of Sudan, including Darfur.180 The UNSC proceeded to request the UN Secretariat 
to start contingency planning and to present it with options for this process. In the next 
several months, such requests were included both in presidential statements and in 
resolutions.181 The UN Secretariat, reluctant to deploy another operation, argued for the need 
for a peace agreement prior to any deployment. A succession of joint assessment missions 
with the AU followed as the peace negotiations in Abuja dragged on without results; waiting 
for results from the next assessment mission and from the peace talks became an almost 
permanent feature of UNSC discussions on Darfur at the time.182 
 
Furthermore large-scale loss of life exists within the Darfur region of Sudan, and the 
Sudanese Government has shown that it is unwilling to halt, or is perhaps implicit in the 
commission of these crimes.183  
 
3.3.1.2 The principle of last resort 
This principle seeks to explore whether all other available options have been exhausted. The 
question asked here is: Have all other non-military options under the RTP been exhausted? 
Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention 
or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing 
lesser measures would not have succeeded or have failed.184 
It is fair to suggest that the situation in Darfur does not meet the third principle. There are 
other non-military tools that could be employed and some have, such as broader sanctions, 
targeted sanctions against Government leaders, or military actions short of an invasion, such 
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as a no fly zone.185 For example on 29 March 2005 and 25 April 2006, the UNSC issued 
Resolutions 1591 and 1672,186  respectively, condemning the continued violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law in Sudan’s Darfur region and, in particular, the 
continuation of violence against civilians and sexual violence against women and girls. The 
measures imposed against Sudan pursuant to UNSC resolutions included; a prohibition on the 
export of arms and related material to any person in Sudan, a prohibition on the provision to 
any person in Sudan, of technical assistance related to arms and related material;187 and a 
travel ban and asset freeze against persons designated by the 1591 Committee.188 Despite all 
these attempts the human rights violations still continue in Darfur.  
 
3.3.1.3   The principle of proportional means 
By this principle, the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should 
be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective and meet the 
defined goals of the mission.189 The military intervention will only be regarded as 
proportional in the event it meets this criteria. In other words, the intervention must involve 
proportional means and follow all norms of humanitarian law, and there must be a reasonable 
belief among policymakers that intervention will succeed in ending suffering and perhaps 
more importantly will not escalate or enlarge the crisis.190 Military operations should be the 
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minimum necessary to secure the objective.191 In the case of Darfur it is difficult to determine 
if a military mission would be of adequate scale and duration. This is compounded by the 
likely rejection of an armed intervention by the Government of Sudan. It is obvious that a 
large external civilian protection force would be required for the proportional means test to be 
satisfied.192  
 
3.3.1.4 The principle of balance of consequences 
This principle poses the question: ‘Is there a reasonable belief that the military intervention 
will actually be able to end the ongoing atrocities and not make the situation worse?’ It is in 
other words a system of assessing prospects of success and the reasonableness of the 
intervention. Finally on the fifth principle it is difficult to predict if military intervention will 
bring an end to the civil war but one thing is certain that human rights violations can be 
reduced and civilians can be protect from the Government funded rebels. Evans identifies   
Darfur as ‘the classic contemporary case’ in which the balance of consequences is against 
coercive military measures,193  in that intervention would put at risk the 2.5 million internally 
displaced people, and the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
 
3.4 The role of the United Nations in Darfur 
In the case of the Darfur crisis, UN attempts for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace were weakened by the strong adherence to the principle of sovereignty as stated in the 
UN Charter and relied upon by the Sudanese Government. In addition to this constitutional 
dilemma for the functioning of the UN, the members of the UNSC have remained divided on 
the crisis and on which action to take. Sudan’s reluctance to accept proposals put forward by 
the UN remains a massive obstacle for a peaceful solution to the crisis.  Unlike the USA, the 
UN has yet to refer to the crisis in Darfur as genocide. In fact no other permanent member of 
the UNSC has done so.  In January 2005, an International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 
authorized by UNSC Resolution 1564 of 2004,194 issued a report to the Secretary-General 
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stating that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide.195According 
to the 1948 Genocide Convention, once the UN acknowledges that it is genocide, it has to 
act.196 Thus it is fair to assume that the UN fears not receiving the military, political and 
financial means it would need to act from its member states in order to bring an end to human 
suffering in Darfur, which could create an illegitimate UN.197In addition the UNSC has 
gradually called for greater UN involvement in the crisis.198 It can be argued that the UN is 
aware of its limitations in this crisis.199 
 
Responding to pressure from the international community, the UNSC passed UNSC 
Resolution 1706, the first resolution to explicitly source the RTP doctrine.200 Although this 
resolution should have been regarded as a victory for the supporters of the RTP, it was 
largely ineffective in providing aid or ensuring the deployment of troops into the region. On 
31 July 2007 the UNSC subsequently passed the Resolution 1769, which provided for the 
deployment of 26 000 troops from both the UN and the AU.201 Nevertheless, only 14 804 
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troops were eventually deployed by 31 October 2009. To date the violence continues while 
little is being done by the UN unlike in the Libyan case were military intervention was 
authorized in a matter of months.202 
 
3.5 The African Union intervention in Darfur 
The AU Act is the first international treaty to recognise the right to intervene for 
humanitarian purposes often referred to as humanitarian intervention.203 The Act provides, in 
Article 4(h), that the AU has the right to intervene in a member state, pursuant to a decision 
of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity.204 
 
In 2004 the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was formed with a force of 150 troops. By mid-
2005, its numbers had increased to about 7 000.205 This was an AU peacekeeping force 
operating primarily in the country's western region of Darfur with the primary objective of 
performing peacekeeping operations related to the Darfur conflict. The AMIS was authorized 
by UNSC Resolution 1564 but was not able to effectively contain the violence in Darfur.206 A 
more sizable, better equipped UN peacekeeping force was originally proposed for September 
2006, but due to opposition from the Sudanese Government, it was not implemented at that 
time. AMIS' mandate was extended repeatedly throughout 2006,207 while the situation in 
Darfur continued to escalate, until AMIS was finally replaced by UNAMID on 31 December, 
2007.208 In August 2004, the AU sent in 150 Rwandan troops to protect the ceasefire 
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monitors.209 It however, soon became apparent that 150 troops would not be enough, so they 
were joined by 150 Nigerian troops. During April 2005, the Government of Sudan signed a 
ceasefire agreement with Sudan People's Liberation Army which led to the end of the Second 
Sudanese Civil War.210 The AU increased the AMIS force by 600 troops and 80 military 
observers. In July 2005, the force was increased by about 3 300 (with a budget of 220 million 
dollars). In April 2005, AMIS was increased to about 7000 (at a cost of over 450 million 
dollars).211   
 
3.6 Summary of Sudan crises  
The case of Darfur displayed the willingness of the AU to intervene, in contrast to the 
ensuing debates at the UNSC over naming the Darfur crisis genocide or not. The international 
reaction to the situation in Darfur struggled to meet the ideals enshrined in the RTP doctrine. 
However, forcible military intervention to stop the violence and establish protection for 
civilians was not possible. Instead, the international community’s attempts to fully implement 
the elements of the RTP were through half measures and overblown promises. It is vital to 
state that the situation in Darfur applies for the first and second Precautionary Principles of 
RTP; the situation in Darfur equalises genocide and gross human rights violations 
continue.212  Furthermore large-scale loss of life exists within the Darfur region of Sudan, and 
the Sudanese Government has shown that it is unwilling to halt these. Perhaps it is implicated 
in the commission of these crimes. Any military intervention under the RTP would be 
undertaken for the right reasons. The implementation of non-military options for the 
prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored to no avail and the just cause 
threshold has been met to constitute military intervention but the UNSC has not authorized 
this. 
 
In addition multiple conflicts and lawlessness in Darfur, arising from the lack of an agreed 
and workable peace agreement, which in turn starts from the disloyalty and ruthlessness of 
the Sudan Government ant the incompetence and arrogance of the leadership of the armed 
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movements. This has proved to be a further hindrance to the proper implementation of the 
RTP. The UN and international donors were also unable to acknowledge the limitations of 
the peacekeepers’ capacity and failed to invest the necessary effort into creating a workable 
peace agreement that could have facilitated UNAMID’s mission, and did not deliver on key 
resources needed by the mission to fulfil its stated mandate thus it can be said that an 
inconsistence in the implementation of the RTP by the UNSC has failed the people of Darfur. 
The next case study on chapter 4 will cover the response y international actors to the 2011 
Libyan uprising and the response that followed by the Libyan Government. It is valuable in 
highlighting the results the international community can achieve if the capacity building and 
early response RTP mechanisms are the primary drivers of policy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4. Making the case for RTP through the Libyan intervention 
In the previous chapters I presented the debate on the implementation of the RTP by 
exploring the case of Sudan and the role played by the UN and AU in terms of conflict 
resolution. I also analysed the Sudan case using the precautionary principles of the RTP. I 
now turn to the case of Libya, on 23 October 2011; the National Transitional Council (NTC) 
declared the liberation of Libya and the official end of the war but in practice the fighting is 
still ongoing in Libya. The international community intervened in the internal armed conflict        
because it felt it had a responsibility to protect the Libyan citizens from being targeted and 
stop other gross human rights violations from taking place. It is noteworthy to see that the 
international community did apply the RTP doctrine. In this chapter I will examine the 
reasons for applying the RTP doctrine in the Libyan case and debate the implementation of 
the RTP further by exploring the case of Libya and the role played by the UN and AU in 
terms of conflict resolution.   
 4.1 Background to the Libyan Conflict 
Gaddafi became the ruler of Libya in 1969. He abolished the Libyan Constitution of 1951, 
and adopted laws based on his own ideology ‘The Green Book’.213 He was supposed to leave 
office and give power to the people in 1977, but clung into power until 2011. During 
Gaddafi’s rule Libya was theoretically a  decentral , direct democracy state run according to 
his philosophy of The Green Book. Gaddafi often manipulated all spheres of Governmental 
structures to ensure his dominance. Despite his autocratic leadership style there were massive 
positives for the Libyan people under Gaddafi’s rule for example; Libya had welfare systems 
allowing access to free education, free healthcare, and financial assistance for housing, access 
to fresh water across large parts of the country. Unfortunately the Government controlled 
every aspect of the daily life of the people.214 
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The Libyan revolution which became a brutal internal armed conflict began with protests 
against Gaddafi’s rule on 15 February 2011; in Benghazi where clashes with security forces 
that fired on the crowd. The protests escalated into a rebellion that spread across the 
country.215 The protesters were armed with Molotov cocktails and stones against which the 
police responded with tear gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets. Libyan security forces 
fired live ammunition into the armed protesters. 216 The rebels were composed primarily of 
civilians, such as teachers, students, lawyers, and oil workers, and a contingent of 
professional soldiers that defected from the Libyan Army and joined the rebels. Throughout 
the conflict Gaddafi's administration had repeatedly asserted that the rebels included al-Qaeda 
fighters.217 The opposition established an interim governing body, the NTC, which was 
recognized by the United Nations on 16 September 2011 and replaced the Gaddafi 
Government. Gaddafi remained at large until 20 October 2011, when he was captured and 
killed attempting to escape the country. The NTC declared the liberation of Libya and the 
official end of the war on 23 October 2011. The Libyan internal  armed conflict was part of a 
bigger wave of protests going around in the Middle East at that moment and it was also 
known as the Arab Spring. The fighting took about half a year before it officially ended.218  
 
4.2 Application of the RTP or War for Profit? 
The year 2011 saw the dawn of the Arab Spring in North Africa and some parts of the Middle 
East. In Tunisia it was responsible for the ousting of President Ben Ali from power. The 
notion of this revolution spread to Egypt accounting for the removal of President Mubarak 
from power. The revolutionary sensation continued to blow in Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. It 
is vital to note that in all these revolutions, the main objective was to depose dictatorial 
regimes and replace them with those that are more open and responsive to basic demands for 
human rights and democratic processes. Among all these countries, Libya was worst affected. 
Instead of the revolution smoothly deposing Gaddafi, he put up a fight of resistance, 
eventually turning the revolution into a full blown internal armed conflict between the 
Government and the rebels (revolutionaries). What distinguishes Libya and the other affected 
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countries is that the UNSC overwhelmingly approved a resolution that eventually led to the 
imposition of a ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya, but giving NATO the responsibility to bomb 
strategic Government military installations.219 When the UNSC passed Resolution (1973), 
this meant that NATO could deliberately aid rebels in their fight against Gaddafi under the 
RTP doctrine. Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides the legal basis for military 
intervention by the UNSC in situations where a threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an 
act of aggression is at hand.220 According to Article 24(1) of the Charter the UNSC carries 
out the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security on behalf of the member 
states and decisions taken by the UNSC is binding upon the member states.221 It can be 
augured that UNSC displayed a biased implementation of the RTP since in their attempts to 
restore peace they never explored more peaceful option such as an UN peace keeping mission 
like in the case of Sudan.  
 
It was also easier to acquire international consensus on Libya because of previous 
occurrences, such the 5 April 1986 bombing of the La Belle nightclub in West Berlin by 
Libyan agents, which killed three people and injured 229 people. Further, the Pan Am Flight 
103 Lockerbie terrorist bombing which downed a Pan Am transatlantic flight from Frankfurt 
to the US on 21 December 1988, killing all 243 passengers and 16 crew on board contributed 
to the ease with which international consensus on Libya was garnered.222 The bombing 
resulted in large sections of the aircraft being strewn over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 11 
more people on the ground. In 2003, Gaddafi accepted responsibility for the Lockerbie 
bombing and paid compensation to the families of the victims, although he maintained never 
having given the order for the attack.223  
 
Even though the AU had a right to intervene in circumstances like the Libyan crisis pursuant 
to Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, such right was not invoked. However, the AU 
High-Level ad hoc Committee devised a roadmap for the peaceful resolution of the Libyan 
crisis. The roadmap was duly endorsed by the AU Assembly of Heads of state and 
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Government but the UNSC ignored these attempts by the AU and opted for their violent 
approach.224 According to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty, there are very few circumstances where military action would be justified 
and therefore must meet the just cause criteria, and these are large-scale loss of life including 
genocide, mass killings, or ethnic cleansing; genocidal intent is not relevant for military 
intervention. The Libyan case did not at all fit the profile of large-scale loss of life and only 
lasted for seven months where as the Sudan crisis has gone on for more than a decade yet the 
just cause precautionary has not been implemented under the RTP in that country. 
 
4.3 International Response and Debate to the Libyan crises 
From the start of the Arab spring most of the western media coverage of the events was 
biased against the Governments in power in the different countries. During the Libyan 
uprising the reporting was a one-sided view of the events, portraying the protest movement as 
entirely peaceful and repeatedly suggesting that the Government's security forces were 
unaccountably massacring unarmed demonstrators who presented no security challenge. This 
established a one-sided view of the international community and put all the blame on the 
Gaddafi regime while reality was that both sides committed crimes. 
 
On 21 February 2011 the rebel opposition to the Gaddafi regime called on the UN to impose 
a no-fly zone on all of Tripoli to cut off all supplies of arms and mercenaries to the regime. 
On 19 March 2011 the military intervention in Libya on the basis of UNSC Resolution 1973 
began. That same day, military operations began, with US forces and one British submarine 
firing cruise missiles, the French Air Force, USA Air Force and British Royal Air Force 
undertaking ground actions across Libya and a naval blockade was established by the Royal 
Navy.225 
 
From the on-set it can be said that the biased coverage by the media and the violence 
portrayed against the rebels created support for a resolution somewhat quick, and even 
though some members of the UNSC did not vote in favour of it, they at least did not veto it. 
 
224
 Final Communique of meeting of the AU High-level ad hoc Committee on Libya, Pretoria, South Africa, 14 
September 2011, South African Government Information, available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=21607&tid=42980 (accessed 22 February 
2013). 
225
 Claes J ‘Libya and the responsibility to protect’ Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention (1 March 2011), 
available at http://www.usip.org/publications/libya-and-the-responsibility-protect (accessed 7 March 2013). 
 
 
 
 


Support from several Arab countries also gave the intervention legitimacy according to 
international law. There was little opposition to the resolution; for example South Africa 
opposed a military intervention.226  
 
The USA was among the first to launch strikes in accordance with the resolution. After 
neutralizing large parts of Libya’s air defence systems, the USA wanted to withdraw and 
hand over the leadership of the operation. The available options were either NATO, or a 
coalition of the nations taking part in the actual operations. An attempt to unify the military 
command of the air campaign first failed over objections by the French, German, and Turkish 
Governments. On 24 March 2011 NATO agreed to take control of the no-fly zone, while 
command of targeting ground units remained with coalition forces.227  Fighting in Libya 
ended in late October following the death of Gaddafi, and NATO stated it would end 
operations over Libya on 31 October 2011. Libya's new Government requested that its 
mission be extended to the end of the year, but on 27 October, the UNSC voted to end 
NATO's mandate for military action on 31 October.228 
 
4.4 Analysis of the Libyan crises based on the Precautionary Principles of RTP 
In addressing the case of Darfur and now with the Libyan case, I have opted to focus on the 
five principles that must be met for a non-consensual military intervention to be a viable 
option and whether the Libyan situation met these conditions. 
 
4.4.1 Principle of seriousness of harm: under this principle one must ask whether the harm 
to the state or the population is serious enough to warrant a military intervention under the 
RTP and if the situation has raised to the level of one of the four core crimes namely 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression?229 
Looking at the first principle one would raise the question why the intervention focused only 
on Libya and not Sudan? NATO and the UNSC constantly make reference to statements 
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made by Gaddafi that he would go ‘house to house’ to cleanse the nation of ‘cockroaches’ 
and ‘rats’, as a justification for the first principle of the RTP. Such statements were viewed as 
incitement to commit crimes against humanity. Comparing Libya to Sudan, in May 2006 the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur organized by UN concluded that ‘the 
Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide though international offences 
such as the crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may 
be more serious and heinous than genocide’.230 One can also pose the question why it took 
the UN so long to even formally condemn the violence, and why there was no consensus 
whatsoever even concerning non-military coercive measures like targeted sanctions of the 
kind until 2007; but unlike the Libyan case where military intervention was unanimously 
agreed on at a stage when the intensity of Gaddafi regime’s violence was much less than that 
of the Sudanese President Omar Hassan al- Bashir. 
 
It is my opinion that Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir crimes against humanity are 
worse than that of Gaddafi’s who only voiced his thoughts while he (al-Bashir) horrible deeds 
are well known that his Government funds rebels who commit genocide in the whole Darfur 
region to this day. 
 
4.4.2 Principle of Proper Purpose 
Secondly the RTP focuses if military intervention has the right intention behind it? This 
means that the primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states 
may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with 
multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned i.e. 
the Libyan people.231 
 
On the second principle, the engagement in Libya is obviously a hard talk point because the 
legitimacy of the mission is in doubt. The mission had two objectives first by the UNSC; its 
mandate for the operation was to protect civilians. The second one was that the Governments 
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with authority over NATO forces had declared that their policy goal is Gaddafi surrendering 
power.  It is a difficult task to separate the one goal from the other. In addition the USA, UK 
and France, were determined to settle for nothing less than regime change, and did whatever 
it took to achieve that.232  Further concerns were that the interveners rejected cease-fire offers 
that may have been serious, struck fleeing personnel that posed no immediate risk to civilians 
and locations that had no obvious military significance such as the compound in which 
Gaddafi’s relatives were killed. This again brings us to the question of universality of the 
implementation of the RTP.233 
 
4.4.3 The principle of Last Resort 
 The relevant question under this principle is whether other non-military options under the 
RTP been exhausted. Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military 
option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with 
reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would either not have succeeded or have 
failed.  
 
It is fair to suggest that the situation in Libya does moderately meet the third principle. There 
are other non-military tools that were not employed, such as broader sanctions, targeted 
sanctions against Government leaders, arms embargos or military actions short of an 
invasion.In the Libyan case, Resolution 1973 came after Resolution 1970 had proved 
ineffective in deterring Gaddafi from violently suppressing the mass protests. Resolution 
1970 was designed to call for restraint and to report any human rights abuses to the ICC.234 
The UNSC obligated all UN member states to freeze without delay all funds, other financial 
assets and economic resources which were on their territories, which were owned or 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities listed in resolution. Resolution 
1973 was passed by the UNSC in March 2011 to authorise a no-fly zone for the protection of 
civilians. In a clear addition to the growing controversies of the use of force, Resolution 1973 
mandated NATO to use ‘all necessary means to protect civilians’. This elasticity could have 
contributed to NATO’s involvement as an offensive force on the side of the rebels and the 
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eventual defeat of the Gaddafi forces and Gaddafi’s eventual death. Questions beg answers as 
to the sincerity of NATO’s intentions in the Libya campaign or the quick implementation of 
resolution 1973. In addition, for example, why would NATO members rush into a military 
campaign to remove Gaddafi from power and not do the same in Sudan or Syria, where 
civilians continue to be killed by incumbent regimes? Was Gaddafi a worse dictator than al-
Assad or al-Bashir in the cases of Syria and Sudan? This observation brings to mind the 
question as to why Western countries would want to liberate one country from the hands of a 
dictator while leaving other people suffering at the hands of similarly brutal regimes. Another 
is the generally, comprehensive support give to the rebel side in what rapidly became a 
internal armed conflict, ignoring the very explicit arms embargo in the process. This clearly 
signals double standards in the implementation of the RTP by UNSC. 
 
It is important to note that the ‘all means necessary’ clause was immediately implemented in 
the form of a bombing operation. The operation was started by a campaign by French fighter 
jets.235 While the French air force was busy destroying Gaddafi’s capacity to resist, Nicholas 
Sarkozy’s Government began a diplomatic offensive aimed at building a strong relationship 
with the leadership of the NTC.236 Throughout the campaign, France played a critical role 
that is certain to model future relations between the two parties. Resolution 1973 all but 
militarised the new rush for African resources and not at all protection of human rights. 
 
4.4.4 The principle of proportional means - The scale, duration and intensity of the planned 
military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human 
protection objective and meet the defined goals of the mission.237 In the case of Darfur it is 
difficult to determine if a military mission would be of adequate scale and duration. 
 
The fourth principle of proportional means was met to a certain extent because military action 
in Libya was undertaken on the assumption that air-strikes would cause the Gaddafi regime to 
abandon its brutal tactics. NATO’s decision to resort to air power emerged as the default 
option due to its perceived low risk and the political sensitivities surrounding the presence of 
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a foreign occupation force. The major issue is whether the subsequent military support that 
NATO gave to the Libyan rebels can be considered to be part of an operation authorized to 
protect civilians. However, the question that begs an answer is whether peace-keeping was 
not a better option since the AU had hinted such calls.238 
 
4.4.5 The principle of balance of consequences 
 Is there a reasonable belief that the military intervention will actually be able to end the 
ongoing atrocities and not make the situation worse? 
 
Finally on the fifth principle, military intervention has clearly been a failure in the Libyan 
case; instead it has turned the country into yet another failed intervention akin to Iraq or 
Afghanistan. Even though the military intervention brought an end to Gaddafi dictatorship, 
almost two years after the UNSC passed Resolution 1973, peace and democracy continues to 
remain elusive for the people of Libya. The country remains unstable, marred by a host of 
tribulations. There have been widespread media reports of frustration among Libyans with 
the pace of reforms since Gaddafi’s fall.239 The NTC has been accused of lack of 
transparency and is unable to address issues of unity, reconciliation and inclusiveness owing 
to fact that the NTC is mired in its own divisions. The security situation in the country is 
worsening with every passing day. A media report observed that, ‘the resentment and 
bitterness Gaddafi incubated is now bursting forth in general lawlessness.240 
 
4.5 The role of the UN in the Libyan Crisis  
UNSC Resolution 1973 will stand out in history as it marked the first military 
implementation of the RTP doctrine. Military action in Libya was preceded by a range of 
tough non-military measures that sought to persuade the Gaddafi’s regime to stop killing. On 
26 February 2011 Resolution 1970 included the referral of the matter to the ICC, the 
imposition of an arms embargo, enforcement of a travel ban for certain individuals and 
freezing the assets of senior regime figures. These measures while coercive were peaceful in 
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nature. However, none of these measures bore fruit. It was only when this chain of preventive 
measures failed that the use of force was finally considered under Resolution 1973. 
 
The UNSC had expressed grave concerns about the violence in Libya and the use of force 
against the country’s civilians. It also criticized the gross and systematic violation of human 
rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the 
deaths of civilians, and rejecting unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence 
against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan Government. 241 
Two weeks after the adoption of Resolution 1970, on 17 March 2011 the UNSC passed 
Resolution 1973 which  backed the use of all necessary measures to enforce no-fly zone over 
Libya which was followed by a NATO-led airborne military operation and those thousands of 
lives at imminent risk were questionably saved. Questions had been raised by some scholars  
in international law such as John and Ruggie who questioned  whether the  decision is in 
adherence to the provisions of the UN Charter.242  The questions raised were for the right 
reasons because the Libyan case does not constitute an example of international threat as 
required by the UN Charter. It can be argued that internal abuses by states do not qualify as 
international threats and thus authorizing the military action in Libya does not conform to the 
provision of Chapter VII, where an exception to the principle of non-interference in domestic 
affairs is provided for. In addition, China and Russia, the two permanent members of the 
UNSC most averse to authorizing military intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
had no special relationship with, or interests in, Libya. So, they had no reason to veto a 
collective action. 
 
4.6 The AU’s failure to take a position on the future of Gaddafi during its roadmap. 
After the failures of the OAU in the past, African leaders recognized the scourge of conflicts 
in Africa as constituting a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the 
continent.243 They also noted that the need to promote peace security and stability are a 
prerequisite for the implementation of the continent’s development and integration agenda.244 
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Whilst the AU is guided by the objective of promoting peace, security and stability on the 
continent245, it is also based on the principle of ‘respect for sanctity of human life’.246 The 
Constitutive Act of AU states that the Union had a right to intervene in a member state 
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely, war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.247 Also, member states were given a right to 
request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.248 Finally, the 
member states of the Union were enjoined to respect democratic principles, human rights, the 
rule of law and good governance. 
 
The AU in its roadmap failed to pronounce itself on the future of Gaddafi in and after the 
negotiation of the political solution to the crisis. While, western permanent members of the 
UNSC (France, United Kingdom (UK) and the USA) were resolute in their demand that 
Gaddafi relinquish power,249 the AU was ambivalent on the issue at best. Asked if Gaddafi 
had to leave power, President Jacob Zuma was of the view that if Gaddafi had to go, the 
issues to be addressed were when, where and how that happens.250  At the 17th AU Summit 
meeting in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, some African officials announced that Gaddafi should 
leave power for a democratic transition to take place.  The final decisions of the Assembly on 
Libya refused to support a no fly zone.  The AU being the only major organisation that had 
not called for the imposition of sanctions or a no-fly zone on Libya, the AU carried very little 
credibility especially with the rebels who saw themselves as liberators. This could to a degree 
explain why they were unenthusiastic about the AU’s political roadmap peaceful resolution. 
 
It was the AU’s lack of clarity on the role of Gaddafi that held back the Union’s mediation 
efforts. After the establishment of the ad hoc Committee, the AU was trying to sell its 
roadmap to resolve the crisis in Libya to the two main protagonists: The Gaddafi Government 
and the NTC. The Committee was able to travel to Libya from 9 to 11 April 2011. It met with 
Gaddafi on 10 April, who accepted the AU roadmap on Libya including the specific issue of 
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the ceasefire and deployment of an effective and credible monitoring mechanism.251 But 
when the Committee travelled to Benghazi the next day to meet the NTC, The two parties did 
not concur regarding a way forward. Despite extensive discussions between the Committee 
and the NTC there was no agreement due to a political condition put forward by the latter as a 
prerequisite for the urgent launching of discussions on the modalities for a ceasefire.252  The 
political condition advanced by the NTC was that it could not negotiate an end to the crisis 
unless Gaddafi relinquished power. According to the NTC, Gaddafi and his Government had 
lost all legitimacy to govern the country and thus could not therefore be interlocutors in 
finding a solution to the crisis. Thus, the NTC refused to agree on the crucial issue of the 
cessation of hostilities.  
 
Nevertheless, the AU Peace and Security Council and the ad hoc Committee have continued 
to pursue the implementation of the roadmap. At the end of May 2011, South African 
President Zuma, a member of the Panel travelled to Libya and met both belligerents. 
However, whilst Gaddafi’s Government accepted his call to adopt the AU roadmap as the 
only solution to resolve the conflict, the NTC rejected the proposal arguing that it could not 
accept any settlement which did not entail the departure of Gaddafi. Also, ahead of the 17th 
AU Summit meeting in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, the ad hoc Committee met twice, in 
Pretoria on 26 June and in Malabo on 30 June, and adopted a Framework Agreement on a 
Political Solution to the Crisis in Libya. The proposal was aimed at bringing the crisis to an 
end, to ensure the effective protection of the civilian population, including the provision of 
humanitarian support, and ushering in a political process that will make it possible to meet 
the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people to democracy, rule of law, good governance 
and respect for human life. The framework was endorsed by the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government at the Malabo Summit and was presented to both parties in the Libya 
crisis.253 
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On Sunday 21 August, rebels launched an offensive to take Tripoli from Gaddafi’s forces. 
They made rapid progress and by the end of the week had overrun much of the capital. Whilst 
Gaddafi went into hiding, he continued making radio broadcasts urging his followers to fight 
and take back the city.254 In the final communiqué of its 291st meeting, the Peace and 
Security Council declined to recognize the NTC as the legitimate authority in Libya.255 Citing 
Article 30 of the Constitutive Act of the AU which bars Governments which come to power 
through unconstitutional means from participating in the activities of the organisation, the 
Peace and Security Council reaffirmed its stand that all the stakeholders in Libya come 
together and negotiate a peaceful process.256 This position would involve the inclusion of 
elements from the Gaddafi regime to be part of the new Government.257 But again the fissures 
that have characterised the AU’s intervention in the crisis continued. Whilst the ad hoc 
Committee and PSC deliberated on the need for the formation of an all-inclusive transitional 
mechanism to lead Libya in the interim as a new Constitution is drafted to provide for 
elections, the Governments of Ethiopia and Nigeria recognised the NTC as the authority in 
charge of Libya.258 
 
4.7 Summary of Libyan crisis  
The Libya crisis has caused many to question the ability of the AU to resolve conflicts on the 
continent without outside help. The fact that the three AU members in the UNSC voted for 
Resolution 1973 for the establishment of a no-fly zone and the consequent bombardment of 
Libya by NATO implies that the AU does not trust its own capacity to deal with conflicts of 
the magnitude in Libya. China noted that it had not exercised its veto out of its respect for the 
AU and the Arab League.259 By voting for Resolution 1973, the AU had shown its 
capitulation to Western pressure and in doing that it was unwittingly giving NATO the 
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responsibility to deal with an African conflict. The effectiveness of African solutions for 
African problems can certainly be questioned in the case of Libya. However, while the 
Libyan problem had grown to proportions where civilians were no longer safe, it was not 
NATO that was supposed to intervene in Libya, rather, it was the AU. As previously stated 
Article 4(h) of the AU act gives the AU the right to intervene forcibly in one of its member 
states with regards to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’. Why would the 
AU go through the longer path via the UN when they could intervene directly in Libya? 
 
 The AU’s interventions in member states to resolve conflicts have suffered from inadequate 
and sometimes a lack of financial resources. The failure to fund the AU Observer Mission in 
Darfur, Sudan is very instructive. The AU due to lack of financial resources was forced to 
depend on donations to fund the mission and eventually was forced to concede UN’s 
intervention there. In addition the UNSC appeared to give priority to the Arab League over 
the AU. But both organisations eventually came to feel as though their views were not heard.  
 
Resolution 1973 explicitly recognized the important role of the Arab League states in matters 
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region. The Council 
only ‘took note’ of the AU Peace and Security Council’s decision to send the ad hoc 
Committee to Libya in its operative declaration of the resolution.260 In other words, the 
resolution recognized the primacy of the Arab League over the AU in the Libya crisis. It is 
necessary that Governments understand that the RTP norm seeks to protect civilians from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing with a range of 
measures, of which military intervention is a last resort. At the same time, we must remind 
member states not to undermine the RTP norm by confusing civilian protection with other 
motives such as regime change or resource control which seem to have been the case in 
Libya. 
 
The conventional account of Libya’s conflict and NATO’s intervention is misleading in 
several key aspects. First, contrary to Western media reports, Gaddafi did not initiate Libya’s 
violence by targeting peaceful protesters. The UN and Amnesty International have 
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documented that in all four Libyan cities initially consumed by civil conflict in mid-February 
2011 Benghazi, Al Bayda, Tripoli, and Misurata violence was actually initiated by the 
protesters. The Government responded to the rebels militarily but never intentionally targeted 
civilians or resorted to ‘indiscriminate’ force, as Western media claimed. Early press 
accounts exaggerated the death toll by a factor of ten, citing ‘more than 2,000 deaths’ in 
Benghazi during the initial days of the uprising, whereas Human Rights Watch (HRW) later 
documented   only 233 deaths across all of Libya in that period.261  
 
Further evidence that Gaddafi avoided targeting civilians comes from the Libyan city that 
was most consumed by the early fighting, Misurata. HRW reports that of the 949 people 
wounded there in the rebellion’s initial seven weeks, only 30 were women or children, 
meaning that Gaddafi’s forces focused narrowly on combatants. During that same period, 
only 257 people were killed among the city’s population of 400,000 a fraction less than 
0.0006 providing additional proof that the Government avoided using force indiscriminately. 
Moreover, Gaddafi did not perpetrate a bloodbath in any of the cities that his forces 
recaptured from rebels prior to NATO intervention including Ajdabiya, Bani Walid, Brega, 
Ras Lanuf, Zawiya, and much of Misurata so there was virtually no risk of such an outcome 
if he had been permitted to recapture the last rebel stronghold of Benghazi. The conventional 
wisdom is also wrong in asserting that NATO’s main goal in Libya was to protect   civilians. 
Evidence reveals that NATO’s primary aim was to overthrow Gaddafi’s regime, even at the 
expense of increasing the harm to Libyans. NATO attacked Libyan forces indiscriminately, 
including some in retreat and others in Gaddafi’s hometown of Sirte, where they posed no 
threat to civilians.262 
 
Moreover, NATO continued to aid the rebels even when they repeatedly rejected 
Government cease-fire offers that could have ended the violence and spared civilians. Such 
military assistance included weapons, training, and covert deployment of hundreds of troops 
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from Qatar, eventually enabling the rebels to capture and summarily execute Gaddafi and 
seize power in October 2011.263 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
In closing this chapter it is vital to note that the failure of the UNSC to consider precautionary 
principles of the RTP has left many questioning NATO’s intervention under the RTP doctrine 
in Libya. The intervention by NATO has led many to assume that the real ambitions of 
NATO were not simply about protecting civilians from a ferocious Gaddafi regime but to 
have access to Libya’s oil, which they have already done, and to get profitable reconstruction 
contracts.264  It is reasonable to come to the assumption that hidden in all this supposed 
kindness by NATO is what we call ‘disaster capitalism’   spreading its tentacles to Africa and 
a militarisation of the new scramble for Africa’s resources. Though  Libya is a prospect for 
those world powers who made or are making profits from Iraq and Afghanistan to further line 
their pockets, many will further view  interventions in the African continent as questionable 
and resource driven rather than the UN trying to fulfil its  responsibility of  world peace.265 
 
It is unfortunate that numerous experts in international humanitarian Law have praised 
NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya as a humanitarian success for averting a bloodbath in 
that country’s second largest city, Benghazi, and helping to eliminate the dictatorial regime of 
Gaddafi. These proponents accordingly claim that the intervention demonstrates how to 
successfully implement the RTP doctrine in practice. Indeed, the top USA representatives to 
the transatlantic alliance declared that NATO’s operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a 
model intervention.266 A more precise assessment, however, reveals that NATO’s 
intervention did more harm than good; it increased the duration of Libya’s internal armed 
conflict  by about six times and its death toll by at least seven times, while also intensifying  
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human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapons proliferation 
in Libya and its neighbours. If this is a ‘model intervention,’ then it is a model of failure.267 
 
The AU’s role in the Libyan crisis was exposed, the fissures within the AU members and thus 
the failure of the organization to mount a united front in the matter.268 In this regard, three 
positions emerged among the members to deal with the situation. The first position advanced 
by inter alia Uganda, South Africa and to an extent Kenya,269 accepted UN Resolution 1973 
in principle but was critical of the way the NATO countries were conducting their operations 
in Libya. To these countries, NATO’s operations went beyond the contours of Resolution 
1973 and in effect were part of ‘regime change doctrine’. The second position advanced by 
the likes of Rwanda, supported the NATO attacks on Libya. President Kagame in particular, 
is reported to have argued that the Libyan situation had degenerated beyond what the AU 
could handle. The third position, advanced by the likes of Zimbabwe, Algeria and Nigeria 
opposed NATO’s operation in Libya and viewed it as Western countries using the UN to get 
rid of the Gaddafi regime. In fact, President Mugabe has accused NATO of being a terrorist 
organization fighting to kill Gaddafi.270 So with these varied positions, the AU could not 
mount an effective intervention in the crisis.271  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
General conclusion and recommendations 
5.1 General conclusion  
From the onset this mini-thesis aimed to demonstrate the inconsistencies in the 
implementation of the RTP doctrine during humanitarian crises with a specific focus on the 
cases of Libya and Sudan. In the previous four chapters I have discussed the RTP doctrine 
and outlined the core principles and elements of the doctrine. I further presented the debate 
on the implementation of the RTP by exploring these two cases and the role played by both 
the AU and UN in terms of conflict resolution. 
In the light of the research questions posed in the first chapter, the current chapter aims at 
concluding and providing recommendations on how best to minimize the inconsistencies in 
the implementation of the RTP doctrine during humanitarian interventions. NATO’s 
intervention in Libya teaches us vital lessons when it comes to the incorrect implementation 
of the RTP. Firstly, potential interveners should beware of half-truths and the opposition 
propaganda. If Western countries had accurately perceived Libya’s initial internal armed 
conflict as Gaddafi using discriminate force against violent tribal, regional, and radical 
Islamist rebels NATO would have most likely not implemented its counterproductive 
intervention.  
The second lesson is that military intervention as a last resort can cause a backlash by 
escalating rebellion which is what happened in Libya. This is because some sub- state groups 
or rebel groups believe that by violently provoking state retaliation, they can attract 
international attention to help them achieve their political objectives, including regime 
change. The resulting escalation, however, magnifies the threat to non-combatants before any 
potential intervention can protect them. Thus, the prospect of humanitarian intervention, 
which is intended to protect civilians, may instead put them in danger through a moral hazard 
dynamic. To reduce this tendency, it is essential to avoid the implementation of the RTP in 
ways that reward rebels, unless the state is targeting non-combatants. A final lesson is that 
intervention initially motivated by the desire to protect civilians is prone to expanding its 
objective to include regime change, even if doing so magnifies the danger to civilians, 
contrary to the interveners’ original intent. That is partly because intervening states, when 
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justifying their use of force to domestic and international audiences, demonize the regime of 
the country they are targeting. This demonization later inhibits the interveners from 
considering a negotiated settlement that would permit the regime or its leaders to retain some 
power, which typically would be the quickest way to end the violence and protect non-
combatants. When analyzing the Libyan case with regards to the UN Resolution 1973, the 
goal of the intervention, was to protect Libyan civilians. However, it was also clear that many 
of the coalition members were also hoping for regime change as a desired outcome whether 
or not this was one of the overtly stated goals of the action. Before the NATO intervention 
the USA President Obama had already stated that Gaddafi must go a further sign that the 
intervention was always aimed at regime change rather than humanitarian grounds which are 
in line with the principles of the RTP.272 Such lessons from NATO’s use of force in Libya 
suggests the need for considerable caution and a comprehensive exploration of alternatives 
when contemplating if and how to conduct humanitarian military intervention under the RTP 
because clearly the Libyan case displays massive inconsistencies in the implementation of the 
RTP by the UNSC. 
 
With regards to the Sudan case it is worth noting that there are strategic religious dimensions 
to the conflict in Darfur, but these need to be clarified to make sense of the recommendation 
below. The North-South conflict in Sudan since 1956 pitted Arab Muslims (north) against 
Black Christians (south); but the case of Darfur is different because the National Islamic 
Front (NIF) that controls the Government of Sudan is engaged in a large-scale violence 
against Darfuris who are mostly Africans, but also Muslims. Therefore, considering the 
Islamist roots of the NIF and al-Bashir’s regime, the AU should counter its religious basis for 
power by strategically and diplomatically making the case that another Muslim-versus-
Muslim conflict would shadow the sectarian violence in Iraq. Also, the looming civil war 
among Palestinians is an affront to Islam and the unity of the ‘ummah’ or Muslim world.273 
This is important since the NIF balks at claims of rape by Janjaweed members, or at least 
Government support for it, as impossible and ‘un-Islamic’. This requires the inclusion of 
predominantly Muslim African nations such as Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and others 
who also hold seats in both the Arab League and the AU to use their influence in discussions 
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with Sudan to compel the al-Bashir regime to ensure the protection of the Darfuris against 
rape, torture, murder and ethnic cleansing by other Muslims. The same can be said of 
Christian-on-Christian violence, as was the case in Rwanda. In the end, the various actors in 
the Darfur crisis, especially states, are only likely to act when compelled by either positive or 
negative incentives to change their behaviour; and in contemporary international politics, 
only the USA has the capability and credibility of action to effectively engage the various 
actors to resolve the Darfur crisis. The painful reality for Africans is that in the realist world 
of politics, countries, including the USA, never choose to intervene for humanitarian 
purposes, but rather for their national interests at the time.274 
 
One may question if  the RTP factors into the national interest of the USA, Russia, China and 
other capable major powers who are directly or indirectly involved with the Government of 
Sudan? The answer is simply no for now. Therefore, the RTP, especially protection of 
Africans, falls to the AU. Its potential for doing well is boundless. At the least, the AU can 
succeed in establishing optimism and override the sense of inevitability of crisis which has 
framed the way Africans and non-Africans have viewed the continent for decades.275 
 
Its premise of Pan-Africanism and unity can be a way for the AU to convince Sudan to take 
strong steps to end the terror of the Janjaweed and prepare for a viable end to the conflict. In 
the meantime, ‘focusing on stabilizing Darfur in terms of, security, political, and 
humanitarian assistance efforts must be supported by adequate funding and logistical support’ 
by African states, resolving African crises especially South Africa, Nigeria, Tanzania   that 
have professed a desire to see an end to the violence in Darfur. The AU has the tools it needs 
to become a solid entity in mediating African issues. It gains strength from the collective 
desire to uphold the RTP principle enshrined in both the UN and AU pronouncements. For 
the international community, especially members of the EU, NATO and the UN and for 
capable states such as the USA, the AU has shown the desire to uphold the RTP. This is 
evidenced by their willingness to supply the troops for peace enforcement; but the AU lacks 
what those groups and nations have – robust and credible logistical equipment like 
helicopters, weapons and money to pay an over-stretched, underpaid, and unprepared African 
force to succeed in an action that is clearly the collective responsibility of the international 
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community if the UN Charter is to remain credible. For the AU, success can occur through 
logistic and financial support for the proposed hybrid UNMIS/AMIS force as well as the 
restart of peace talks as specified above. 
 
I have come to the conclusion that inconsistencies within the application of the RTP exist 
because humanitarian intervention under the RTP is influenced by political considerations 
and this affects its implementation. The RTP is often used as a justification for states to act in 
conflicts when there is no domestic support for more direct political intervention. It also 
allows states to intervene in the name of a higher purpose. The decision to intervene in most 
cases is heavily weighted by the values and political position of the intervening states which 
is in most instances western states. Thus, I believe that intervention can never be completely 
humanitarian driven until the five RTP precautionary principles are used as a guideline or 
criteria for interventions.  
 
5.2 Recommendations 
Since the Darfur crisis is an African problem with global implications, a basic responsibility 
for the AU would be to boldly and unequivocally label the crisis in Darfur as ethnic 
cleansing/genocide. This would include labelling the crisis a grave situation and a crime 
against humanity, a clear warning to the Khartoum-based Sudanese Government and the 
Janjaweed leadership that failure to stop the large-scale violence will leave them open to 
charges of crimes against humanity consistent with the provisions of the ICC Statute.276 This 
would have two immediate results: first, it would activate Article 4(h) of the AU’s 
Constitutive Act requiring the organization to take action; and secondly, it would avoid the 
definitional conflict over the term genocide and compel African Governments to clearly 
identify their support for the AU’s Constitutive Act to which they are signatories. With clear 
identification of the crisis as genocide/ethnic cleansing and with the presence of robust 
military intervention for purposes of establishing a cease-fire in the region, the AU should 
then place travel restrictions on the top leaders of the Government of Sudan and rebels 
responsible for atrocities, except for travel related to negotiation and resolution of the 
conflict. The strategy should include: freezing the bank accounts of all affected individuals 
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and groups, imposing sanctions on Sudanese companies deemed to be complicit in any 
atrocities that the AU is attempting to bring to an end and compensating those whose actions 
help bring an end to large-scale violence.277 
One of the vital contributions of the ICISS report relates to how it deals with military action 
as a coercive measure to guarantee the protection of civilians. Apart from clarifying that 
military intervention must be a last resort, the report identifies precautionary principles such 
as proportional means and reasonable prospects. If these principles are respected, it will 
represent an important step forward in addressing the fears of the country’s most reluctant to 
forget the principle of non-interference. As an absolute priority of the RTP, international 
organizations and states should make an effort to fill the gap between rhetoric and the 
resources for conflict prevention. There must be strategies to implement the RTP with 
measures such as the creation of early warning mechanisms, support of academic institutes 
and NGOs and capacity building of mediators. In this sense, it is necessary to support the 
initiative of the ICISS co-chair and others to create a Global Coalition for the RTP. The 
efficient implementation of the RTP by organizations such as the AU shows the universal 
power of the principle. Moreover, the increasing inclusion of the protection of civilians in the 
mandates of peace missions represents a positive step. However, these advances in the 
implementation of the principle result useless if they are not accompanied by the allocation of 
resources and the creation of capacities. 
 
The Darfur experience shows the complex situations in which missions that aim mainly at 
protecting civilians are carried out. Even though the response of the AU was positive, the 
international community has to learn from the consequences of not manifesting a unified 
political commitment from the beginning. The extremely unstable situation of civilian in 
Darfur is due, in part, to the late and insufficient response of the international community. 
Nevertheless, Darfur also shows the difficulties in approving coercive measures against a 
sovereign Government. It can be argued that in some cases inaction is the result of caution. 
Resistance from the AU and others to apply economic sanctions to Khartoum is a good 
example of this. In some situations, there is greater loss than gains by applying coercive 
measures.                                (Word count 28120)       
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